Monopsony

Banning Noncompete Agreements Benefits Low-Wage Workers

Examining the effects of a 2008 ban on noncompete agreements for low-wage workers in Oregon, a recent paper finds that the ban increased average...

How Amazon's Pricing Policies Squeeze Sellers and Result in Higher Prices for Consumers

Amazon's price matching policies, which were meant to ensure its dominant position, diminished the ability of brands to control how their products are distributed...

Restoring Antimonopoly Through Bright-Line Rules

The “consumer welfare” approach to antimonopoly is the main contributor to the extreme and dangerous concentrations of power that Americans face today. In place...

Regulators Should Not Change the Regulatory Environment to Include Labor Market Concentration

Research has shown that labor markets with higher levels of labor market concentration have lower wages. It does not necessarily follow that regulators should...

Why Local Labor Market Concentration Is Lower Than It Used to Be, Even As National Concentration Increases

A new study compares the trends in national and local industrial concentration between 1976 and 2015, and explains why they diverged. The idea that firms...

Editors’ Briefing: This Week in Political Economy (July 7–14)

Brett Kavanaugh is expected to bring his pro-business bent to the Supreme Court; the DOJ is appealing the AT&T-Time Warner merger approval; Britain fines...

Data Workers of the World, Unite!

With solutions to the threats of digital monopolies currently looking unlikely to come from the state, law and economics scholars Eric Posner and Glen...

Strong Employers and Weak Employees: Study Sheds New Light on How Labor Market Concentration Hurts Workers

New study finds that wages are significantly lower in concentrated labor markets—and even lower in labor markets where unionization rates are low. America’s decades-long wage...

Antitrust in the Labor Market: Protectionist, or Pro-Competitive?

Redirecting antitrust enforcement to confront monopsony power would be a substantial departure from the way it has been conducted in recent decades, but just...

Monopsony Takes Center Stage

Bringing the powerful weapons the federal competition authorities have to bear on the problem of monopsony would be a substantial, but necessary departure from recent...

LATEST NEWS

Merged Firms Offer Less Product Variety

In new research, Enghin Atalay, Alan Sorensen, Christopher Sullivan, and Wanjia Zhu find that mergers and acquisitions often lead to the merged firm offering less product variety than when the two firms operated pre-merger.

Revising Guideline 6 With Evidence To Establish a Structural Inference for Input Foreclosure

Vertical merger law lacks the structural presumption of horizontal merger law, which shifts the burden from the government to the merging parties to provide evidence that a merger will not produce anticompetitive effects when it is known that the merger will substantially increase market concentration. To improve Guideline 6 of the draft Merger Guidelines concerning vertical foreclosure, Steven Salop develops a three-factor criteria with which the government antitrust agencies can show an analogous structural “inference” that shifts the burden of evidence to the merging parties.

How US Antitrust Enforcement Against Xerox Promoted Innovation by Japanese Competitors

Xerox invented modern copier technology and was so successful that its brand name became a verb. In 1972, U.S. antitrust authorities charged Xerox with monopolization and eventually ordered the licensing of all its copier-related patents. As new research by Robin Mamrak shows, this antitrust intervention promoted subsequent innovation in the copier industry, but only among Japanese competitors. Nevertheless, their innovations benefited U.S. consumers.

Revising the Merger Guidelines To Return Antitrust to a Sound Economic and Legal Foundation

The draft Merger Guidelines largely replace the consumer welfare standard of the Chicago School with the lessening of competition principle found in the 1914 Clayton Act. This shift would enable the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice Antitrust Division to utilize the full extent of modern economics to respond to rising concentration and its harmful effects, writes John Kwoka.

How Anthony Downs’s Analysis Explains Rational Voters’ Preferences for Populism

In new research, Cyril Hédoin and Alexandre Chirat use the rational-choice theory of economist Anthony Downs to explain how populism rationally arises to challenge established institutions of liberal democracy.