Federal Reserve
How Trust in Institutions Impacts Monetary Policy
Social trust in democratic institutions affects the ability of those institutions to carry out policy. In new research, Rustam Jamilov shows how decreasing trust in the U.S. institutions has reduced the ability of the Federal Reserve to influence the economy in states that exhibit lower levels of trust.
Nobel Laureate Douglas Diamond on How the Fed Could Have Prevented SVB’s Collapse
Nobel Laureate and bank run expert Douglas Diamond argues that the Fed’s choice to signal long-term low interest rates, and then suddenly...
In Search of the Monetary Standard
Central banks create the monetary standard. Standard Federal Reserve System (Fed) rhetoric is that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) pursues the...
The Cantillon Effect: Why Wall Street Gets a Bailout and You Don’t
According to the 18th-century French banker and philosopher Richard Cantillon, who benefits when the state prints money is based on its institutional setup. In...
Is Monetary Policy Independence Out of Date? A Mini-Course With Paul Tucker (Part 3)
The Federal Reserve and the ECB have been taking unprecedented steps to react to the financial impact of Covid-19. To frame the debate around the...
Constitutional Limits to Independent Agencies and Central Banks: A Mini-Course With Paul Tucker (Part 2)
The Federal Reserve and the ECB have been taking unprecedented steps to react to the financial impact of Covid-19. To frame the debate around the...
Should Central Banks Have Constraints During a Crisis? A Mini-Course With Paul Tucker (Part 1)
The Federal Reserve and the ECB have been taking unprecedented steps to react to the financial impact of Covid-19. To frame the debate around the...
The Economics of the Covid-19 Bailout: a Webinar
Princeton Professor Markus Brunnermeier and Nellie Liang, the former director of the Division of Financial Stability at the Federal Reserve, discuss the legacy of policy...
Stick, Carrot, and Evergreen Loans: A Policy Proposal to Save Small and Medium-Sized Firms
Restaurant owners, retailers, and the like employ more than 50 percent of the US workforce, yet neither have cash buffers nor access to Federal Reserve support. In...
A Former Central Banker Tells Other Central Bankers: “Stay Away From Davos”
In an interview with ProMarket, former Bank of England deputy governor Sir Paul Tucker explains why the “unelected power” of central bankers threatens our...
LATEST NEWS
Antitrust and Competition
Revising Guideline 6 With Evidence To Establish a Structural Inference for Input Foreclosure
Vertical merger law lacks the structural presumption of horizontal merger law, which shifts the burden from the government to the merging parties to provide evidence that a merger will not produce anticompetitive effects when it is known that the merger will substantially increase market concentration. To improve Guideline 6 of the draft Merger Guidelines concerning vertical foreclosure, Steven Salop develops a three-factor criteria with which the government antitrust agencies can show an analogous structural “inference” that shifts the burden of evidence to the merging parties.
Antitrust and Competition
How US Antitrust Enforcement Against Xerox Promoted Innovation by Japanese Competitors
Xerox invented modern copier technology and was so successful that its brand name became a verb. In 1972, U.S. antitrust authorities charged Xerox with monopolization and eventually ordered the licensing of all its copier-related patents. As new research by Robin Mamrak shows, this antitrust intervention promoted subsequent innovation in the copier industry, but only among Japanese competitors. Nevertheless, their innovations benefited U.S. consumers.
Antitrust and Competition
Revising the Merger Guidelines To Return Antitrust to a Sound Economic and Legal Foundation
The draft Merger Guidelines largely replace the consumer welfare standard of the Chicago School with the lessening of competition principle found in the 1914 Clayton Act. This shift would enable the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice Antitrust Division to utilize the full extent of modern economics to respond to rising concentration and its harmful effects, writes John Kwoka.
Economic History
How Anthony Downs’s Analysis Explains Rational Voters’ Preferences for Populism
In new research, Cyril Hédoin and Alexandre Chirat use the rational-choice theory of economist Anthony Downs to explain how populism rationally arises to challenge established institutions of liberal democracy.
Antitrust and Competition
The Impact of Large Institutional Investors on Innovation Is Not as Positive as One Might Expect
In a new paper, Bing Guo, Dennis C. Hutschenreiter, David Pérez-Castrillo, and Anna Toldrà-Simats study how large institutional investors impact firm innovation. The authors find that large institutional investors encourage internal research and development but discourage firm acquisitions that would add patents and knowledge to their firms’ portfolios, hampering overall innovation.
