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Maurice Stucke explains three policy approaches to algorithmic collusion and discrimination, and makes the case for a broader ecosystem approach that addresses not only the shortcomings of current antitrust law and merger review, but extends beyond them for a comprehensive policy response to the many risks associated with artificial intelligence.

The Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State hosted with the Rustandy Center for Social Sector Innovation, in partnership with the Financial Times, a virtual event discussing shareholder democracy with Lisa Fairfax, Alex Thaler and Luigi Zingales. The following is a transcript of the event.

Social trust in democratic institutions affects the ability of those institutions to carry out policy. In new research, Rustam Jamilov shows how decreasing trust in the U.S. institutions has reduced the ability of the Federal Reserve to influence the economy in states that exhibit lower levels of trust.

The Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State hosted its annual antitrust and competition conference in late April. The following is a transcript of the Judges Frank Easterbrook and Diane Wood's keynote conversation with Stigler Center Fellow Filippo Lancieri.

Kurt Davis Jr. argues that the U.S. Congress should consider switching from a federal debt ceiling as a nominal value to one fixed as a percentage of GDP. This debt ceiling should, on the one hand, be high enough that the government cannot reasonably cross it, but punitive enough that it disincentivizes profligate spending. This will save the U.S. from the annual political theater that occurs around debt ceiling talks and focus the discussion on the federal budget (and potentially taking revenue and spending decisions to actually control the deficit).

Most mergers in industries with only a handful of competitors are anticompetitive, so why don’t we block them? The fix is to use a structural presumption to lower the burden for regulators.

The second Affiliate Fellows cohort at the Stigler Center at Chicago Booth is a multidisciplinary group of economists, business scholars, lawyers, and political scientists.

Why ban competitive offers in the online world when they’re allowed offline? Big tech wants plain vanilla broadband pricing because it forecloses platform competition.

Daryl Lim explains that while there is some evidence that pricing algorithms facilitate collusion, there are reasons to be skeptical of their effectiveness. Lim advocates for compliance by design: firms should create algorithms that don’t collude on price, comply with reporting their algorithms transparently, and know that they will be held responsible for the actions the algorithm takes.

Does investing in information technology (IT) enable firms to “scale without mass” and increase their market share? In a new paper, Erik Brynjolfsson, Wang Jin, and Xiupeng Wang examine how IT affects firm size, market concentration, and the labor share of revenue.