Competition
How Newspaper Competition Fueled Quebec’s 1837 Rebellion
In new research, Patrick Crawford and Vincent Geloso find that areas in Lower Canada with more newspaper competition were more likely to rebel in Quebec’s 1837 Rebellion. Irrespective of political leaning, newspapers in more competitive markets helped citizens to share grievances and coordinate their actions.
The EU’s Merger Guidelines Risk Undermining Their Own Progress
The European Union’s draft Merger Guidelines strengthen competition enforcement by acknowledging the potential harms of market concentration to society, including worker bargaining power and more vulnerable democratic institutions. However, Max von Thun and Claire Lavin argue that this progress is undermined by the introduction of a bias for scale and efficiency loopholes, which give large corporations more paths to complete a merger.
How Competition Has Increased Fraud in Medicare’s DME Program
In new research, Renuka Diwan, Paul Eliason, Riley League, Ryan C. McDevitt, James W. Roberts, and Jetson Leder-Luis investigate how Medicare’s shift to a competitive bidding system to reduce prices has inadvertently shifted market share to fraudulent suppliers.
The Bottom-Line Case for Better Workplaces
In new research, Mario Amore, Morten Bennedsen, Birthe Larsen, and Zeyu Zhao examine the symbiotic relationship between working environments and employee well-being, finding that when workers are safe and satisfied, companies profit.
How Rising Corporate Market Power Undermines Democracy
In new research, Seda Basihos investigates the relationship between a decline in market competition and global democratic backsliding. She finds that market concentration leads to increasing political power for giant firms—a trend that ultimately erodes democracy levels.
How Firms Use Public Communication To Collude and What Regulators Can Do About It
In new research, Tomaso Duso, Joseph Harrington, Carl Kreuzberg, and Geza Sapi demonstrate how their screening tool can aid antitrust authorities in identifying potential collusion between firms through public communications.
Self-Preferencing Theories Need To Account for Exploitative Abuse
Patrice Bougette, Oliver Budzinski, and Frédéric Marty argue in their research that antitrust authorities on both sides of the Atlantic must take into consideration...
A New Merger Tool Protects Consumers from Limits of the Cournot Effect
The widely accepted Cournot effect assumes that the merger of complementary firms benefits downstream firms and consumers (in addition to the merged firms themselves)...
User Hesitancy Increases Online Platforms’ Incumbency Advantage
“Incumbency advantage” among Big Tech platforms recognizes that network effects prevent users from leaving established platforms for emerging competitors. Gary Biglaiser, Jacques Crémer, and...
The Needless Desertion of Robinson-Patman
ProMarket is kicking-off a discussion of the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA), an antitrust law preventing price discrimination that hasn't been enforced in decades. Erik Peinert...
