Editors’ Briefing: This Week in Political Economy (May 4–May 12)

A whistleblower alleges fraud in the audits of Silicon Valley companies; AT&T acknowledges that hiring Michael Cohen was a "bad mistake"; new analysis finds that...

The Stigler Center Dedicates Second Annual Antitrust and Competition Conference to Digital Platforms and Concentration

The invitation-only conference will bring together economists, law scholars, intellectuals, venture capitalists, and businesspeople to debate how to promote competition in a world of...

Editors’ Briefing: On Our Radar This Week (Feb. 2–Feb. 10)

This week in political economy.     India’s competition authority imposed a 1.36 billion rupees ($21.1 million) fine on Google after it found the company guilty...

Editors’ Briefing: On Our Radar This Week (Jan. 29–Feb. 2)

This week in political economy.   As cities across America continue to compete for Amazon’s second headquarters, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis President Neel Kashkari...

Editors’ Briefing: On Our Radar This Week (Jan. 5–13)

This week in political economy.      Facebook is embarking on a radical overhaul of its news feed, emphasizing status updates from friends and family and...

Amazon at $1,000 – Should We Be Celebrating?

Amazon, whose stock price crossed $1,000 per share last week, illustrates the shortcomings of our current antitrust regime. Last Tuesday, Amazon’s stock price crossed $1,000...

“Google Is as Close to a Natural Monopoly as the Bell System Was in 1956"

Media scholar Jonathan Taplin, author of the new book Move Fast and Break Things, on the rent-seeking and regulatory capture of digital platforms. In 2014,...


Merged Firms Offer Less Product Variety

In new research, Enghin Atalay, Alan Sorensen, Christopher Sullivan, and Wanjia Zhu find that mergers and acquisitions often lead to the merged firm offering less product variety than when the two firms operated pre-merger.

Revising Guideline 6 With Evidence To Establish a Structural Inference for Input Foreclosure

Vertical merger law lacks the structural presumption of horizontal merger law, which shifts the burden from the government to the merging parties to provide evidence that a merger will not produce anticompetitive effects when it is known that the merger will substantially increase market concentration. To improve Guideline 6 of the draft Merger Guidelines concerning vertical foreclosure, Steven Salop develops a three-factor criteria with which the government antitrust agencies can show an analogous structural “inference” that shifts the burden of evidence to the merging parties.

How US Antitrust Enforcement Against Xerox Promoted Innovation by Japanese Competitors

Xerox invented modern copier technology and was so successful that its brand name became a verb. In 1972, U.S. antitrust authorities charged Xerox with monopolization and eventually ordered the licensing of all its copier-related patents. As new research by Robin Mamrak shows, this antitrust intervention promoted subsequent innovation in the copier industry, but only among Japanese competitors. Nevertheless, their innovations benefited U.S. consumers.

Revising the Merger Guidelines To Return Antitrust to a Sound Economic and Legal Foundation

The draft Merger Guidelines largely replace the consumer welfare standard of the Chicago School with the lessening of competition principle found in the 1914 Clayton Act. This shift would enable the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice Antitrust Division to utilize the full extent of modern economics to respond to rising concentration and its harmful effects, writes John Kwoka.

How Anthony Downs’s Analysis Explains Rational Voters’ Preferences for Populism

In new research, Cyril Hédoin and Alexandre Chirat use the rational-choice theory of economist Anthony Downs to explain how populism rationally arises to challenge established institutions of liberal democracy.