Lina M. Khan

Lina Khan is a legal fellow with the Open Markets Program at New America, an associate research scholar at Yale Law School, and a fellow with the Information Society Project. She researches market competition across sectors, and the way that antitrust law and competition policy shape our political economy. Khan’s work has been published by the Yale Law Journal and the Harvard Law & Policy Review, as well as by the New Republic, Politico, the Washington Monthly, and the Washington Post. Her antitrust work has been cited by Bloomberg, The Economist, New York Times, and Wall Street Journal. While at Yale, Khan represented and litigated on behalf of homeowners through the Mortgage Foreclosure Litigation Clinic. She also spent summers litigating at Gupta Wessler PLLC, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. She received a B.A. magna cum laude in political theory from Williams College and a J.D. from Yale Law School.

Designating Tech Platforms as “Information Fiduciaries” Would Do Little to Address the Source of Their Power

The notion that Facebook, Google, and Twitter should be assigned fiduciary duties toward their end users has gained broad support in recent years. However, this...

What Makes Tech Platforms So Powerful?

What are the bases of the digital platforms’ power? In Chapter 3 of our Digital Platforms and Concentration ebook in advance of this month’s...

Amazon at $1,000 – Should We Be Celebrating?

Amazon, whose stock price crossed $1,000 per share last week, illustrates the shortcomings of our current antitrust regime. Last Tuesday, Amazon’s stock price crossed $1,000...

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A World With Far Fewer Mergers

Brooke Fox and Walter Frick analyze research and ideas presented at the Stigler Center Antitrust and Competition Conference that question the value of mergers.

The Banking Risks of Central Bank Digital Currencies

The implementation of central bank digital currencies as the primary medium of exchange would exacerbate the flaws of our current fiat system which encourage banks to overextend credit and create liabilities that they cannot redeem. This will worsen the already recurring cycles of financial crises, writes Vibhu Vikramaditya.

The Whig History of the Merger Guidelines

A pervasive "Whig" view of United States antitrust history among scholars and practitioners celebrates the Merger Guidelines' implementation of increasingly sophisticated economic methods since their...

Algorithmic Collusion in the Housing Market

While the development of artificial intelligence has led to efficient business strategies, such as dynamic pricing, this new technology is vulnerable to collusion and consumer harm when companies share the same software through a central platform. Gabriele Bortolotti highlights the importance of antitrust enforcement in this domain for the second article in our series, using as a case study the RealPage class action lawsuit in the Seattle housing market.

The Future Markets Model Explains Meta/Within: A Reply to Herb Hovenkamp

In response to both Herb Hovenkamp’s February 27 article in ProMarket and, perhaps more importantly, also to Hovenkamp’s highly regarded treatise, Lawrence B. Landman, first, shows that the Future Markets Model explains the court’s decision in Meta/Within. Since Meta was not even trying to make a future product, the court correctly found that Meta would not enter the Future Market. Second, the Future Markets Model is the analytical tool which Hovenkamp says the enforcers lack when they try to protect competition to innovate.

The Chicago Boys and the Chilean Neoliberal Project

In a new book, The Chile Project: The Story of the Chicago Boys and the Downfall of Neoliberalism, Sebastian Edwards details the history of neoliberalism in Chile over the past seventy years. The Chicago Boys—a group of Chilean economists trained at the University of Chicago through the U.S. State Department’s “Chile Project”—played a central role in neoliberalism’s ascent during General Augusto Pinochet’s rule. What follows is an excerpt from the book on University of Chicago economist Milton Friedman’s 1975 visit to Chile to meet with Pinochet and business leaders.

Creating a Modern Antitrust Welfare Standard that Integrates Post-Chicago and Neo-Brandeisian Goals

Darren Bush, Mark Glick, and Gabriel A. Lozada argue that the Consumer Welfare Standard  is inconsistent with modern welfare economics and that a modern approach to antitrust could integrate traditional Congressional goals as advocated by the Neo-Brandesians. Such an approach could be the basis for an alliance between the post-Chicago economists and the Neo-Brandesians.