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John G. Matsusaka

John G. Matsusaka is the Charles F. Sexton Chair in American Enterprise in the Marshall School of Business, Gould School of Law, and Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Southern California. His research focuses on political economy and corporate government, in particular on direct democracy and representation. He teaches classes on corporate finance, corporate governance, political economy, and microeconomics. His research has been published in leading journals in economics, finance, political science, and law, and he is the author of two books, most recently, Let the People Rule: How Direct Democracy Can Meet the Challenge of Population (2020).
ESG, Corporate Governance & Future of the Firm

Investors Should Engage With Firms They Want To Go Green, Not Divest

Matthew E. Kahn
How can investors use capital markets to encourage emissions reductions? In new research, Matthew E. Kahn, John G. Matsusaka, and Chong Shu examine whether public pension funds are more effective in mitigating pollution when they divest from fossil fuel companies or actively engage their management.
News

Voters Still Believe Politics is About the Common Good, Not Just Rent-Seeking

Chad Kendall
Do voters still believe that politics can be a source for common-good policies and not just partisan bickering and rent-seeking? With political polarization at...
News

A Challenge for Stakeholder Capitalism: Solving the Paradoxes of Voting

John G. Matsusaka
If corporations are to maximize shareholder welfare, managers need to discover what shareholders value; political theory shows how difficult this can be. Editor’s note: To...
Commentary

How to Get Police Reform Done? Use Direct Democracy

John G. Matsusaka
Instead of just imploring their representatives to fix things, Americans can use the tools of direct democracy to take charge and promote meaningful policing...
ESG, Corporate Governance & Future of the Firm

Turning Corporations into Democracies

John G. Matsusaka
The problem with encouraging firms to maximize shareholder welfare is how to prevent managers and special interests from diverting corporate resources in the name of shareholder...
ESG, Corporate Governance & Future of the Firm

Does Empowering Shareholders Also Empower Special Interests?

John G. Matsusaka
The merits of increasing shareholder power are less obvious than reforms that increase companies' exposure to pressure from activist shareholders, since increasing shareholder power tends to...
ESG, Corporate Governance & Future of the Firm

Enhancing Competition? The Role of Governance in Increasing Exposure to Competition

John G. Matsusaka
Contemporary corporate governance reform has been a mixed bag: reforms that increase a company’s exposure to competition through the control market have been helpful,...

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