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Antitrust and Competition

A key distinction in economic viewpoints that goes oft-unnoticed is between pro-business and pro-market. A good bellwether to where someone stands on the pro-business/market continuum is his/her stance on antitrust policy: pro-business usually favors incumbents, while pro-market calls for aggressive antitrust enforcement to facilitate competition.
“I would not dispute that even a monopoly-ridden market would be preferable to any economic system trying to operate without any kind of a market. But given the prevalence or the danger of substantial intrusion of monopoly into the market, the logic of the laissez faire defense of the market against state-intervention collapses and there is called for instead, by its very logic, state-suppression or state-regulation of monopoly practices, which one may wish to call, as Henry Simons called it, an instance of “positive laissez faire” or, as I prefer, as an instance of deliberate departure from laissez faire.” Jacob Viner – The Intellectual History of Laissez Faire (1960)

Antitrust and Competition

If Venture Capital Believes Merger Control Stymies Growth, They Have the Resources To Prove It

Shishene Jing
Supporters of more robust antitrust policy have pointed to the subsequent success of Figma after authorities blocked Adobe’s acquisition of it. Skeptics, including venture capitalists, have argued that the one case reveals nothing systematic about the benefits of stronger merger review. Venture capitalists happen to be the one party with the data and resources to fund the studies to show any systematic correlation one way or the other. They should do so, writes Shishene Jing.
Antitrust and Competition

AICOA II Is America’s Reverse Industrial Policy Initiative

Herbert Hovenkamp
The revived American Innovation Choice Online Act singles out a handful of Big Tech giants for unique, antitrust-like restrictions, but without the standard methodological...
Antitrust and Competition

Firm Coordination Creates Unstable Merger Waves 

Semih Uslu
In new research, Semih Üslü and Flavien Moreau argue that waves of mergers and acquisition, which are typically unstable and ultimately crash, are not driven by changes in economic conditions, but by self-reinforcing appetite for mergers among firms when others are also engaging in M&A. Policies that drive stable, low-merger conditions can lead to better outcomes for consumers.
Antitrust and Competition

The Draft Merger Guidelines Must Make More Explicit the EU’s Constitutional Values

Kati Cseres
The EU’s constitutional framework and European Union Court of Justice’ case law have evolved since the European Union enacted the first Merger Guidelines in 2004. The revised Merger Guidelines should better engage with these developments and reflect the priority constitutional values and democracy now play in economic policy, writes Kati Cseres.
Antitrust and Competition

Bank Mergers Aren’t Raising Your Mortgage Rate

Celso Brunetti
In new research examining 44 million U.S. mortgages and nearly 5,000 bank mergers over three decades, Celso Brunetti, Jeffrey H. Harris, and Ioannis Spyridopoulos find that bank consolidation does not raise mortgage rates, restrict credit access, or degrade loan quality. Local mortgage markets remain intensely competitive. 
Antitrust and Competition

Dynamic Competition Is (Also) a Pro-Enforcement Framework

Nicolas Petit
The European Union’s draft Merger Guidelines give a central role to dynamic competition in merger review. Some scholars have criticized dynamic competition as an analytical tool that seems to always discourage government intervention, given how quickly and unexpectedly—or dynamically—innovation can remake a market. Nicolas Petit, Selcukhan Unekbas, Bowman Heiden, and Pierre Regibeau argue this critique ignores the several large cases in which regulators used dynamic competition to intervene in a merger.
Antitrust and Competition

Antitrust as a Cure for the Private Equity Disease

Theodosia Stavroulaki
The United States healthcare system has experienced an expansion of private equity ownership. In new research, Theodosia Stavroulaki argues that private equity acquisitions risk harming healthcare by increasing prices, reducing quality of care, limiting access to care, and hurting the labor force.
Antitrust and Competition

South Africa Shows How the EU Merger Guidelines Can Account for Non-Economic Factors

Maciej Bernatt
The draft EU Merger Guidelines open merger analysis to non-economic considerations, including choice, supply chain resilience, and sustainability. However, they do not yet explain how these considerations will be paired with a traditional consumer welfare analysis of price and quantity. Maciej Bernatt and Simbarashe Tavuyanago look to South Africa to devise a “vulnerable consumer test” that can help bridge these economic and non-economic goals.
Antitrust and Competition

When is Corporate Bribery a Good Investment?

Vishavdeep Sharma
In new research, Vishavdeep Sharma and Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar analyze corporate corruption through the lens of market competition. Firms often bribe officials to block rivals from entering their markets, and their incentive to do so depends less on how competitive a market is than on what kind of competition it has.
Antitrust and Competition

The EU’s Merger Guidelines Risk Undermining Their Own Progress

Max von Thun
The European Union’s draft Merger Guidelines strengthen competition enforcement by acknowledging the potential harms of market concentration to society, including worker bargaining power and more vulnerable democratic institutions. However, Max von Thun and Claire Lavin argue that this progress is undermined by the introduction of a bias for scale and efficiency loopholes, which give large corporations more paths to complete a merger.
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The publication of the Stigler Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business

ProMarket is dedicated to discussing how competition tends to be subverted by special interests. The posts represent the opinions of their writers, not necessarily those of the University of Chicago, the Booth School of Business, or its faculty. For more information, please visit ProMarket Policy.