Antitrust and Competition

Family Ties and the Boundaries of the Firm in Antitrust Enforcement

In new research, Mariana Pargendler, Maria Luiza Mesquita, and Lucas Víspico study how antitrust authorities in the Global South have used family ties to define business enterprises and analyze mergers and acquisitions for possibly anticompetitive behavior.

Do Antitrust Enforcers Know They Induce Shrinkflation?

The United States has recently experienced shrinkflation. Many companies have downsized their products while keeping prices unchanged or even raising prices. Barak Orbach argues that misguided beliefs that failed antitrust policies enabled the decay of business morality have compromised the understanding of shrinkflation. The phenomenon typically arises when supply shocks or other factors inflate production costs in the economy and competitive pressures limit the ability of businesses to raise prices to pass on cost increases.

What Signal are the Draft Merger Guidelines Sending to Enforcers Elsewhere?

Cristina Caffarra discusses the animating principles and profound changes brought about by the new draft Merger Guidelines, and argues they will resonate with policy makers and enforcers in other jurisdictions.

Eleanor Fox: A Slice of Forgotten History and Its Light on the Future – Changing the Lens on Antitrust

Eleanor Fox provides her round-one comments on the draft Merger Guidelines. To read more from the ProMarket Merger Guidelines Symposium, please see here.

Why Does the FTC Continue To Pursue Losing Cases?

The Federal Trade Commission has recently lost a series of cases seeking to prevent Big Tech mergers and acquisitions. Jay Ezrielev offers several possible explanations for why the FTC continues to pursue these bad cases and suggests how the agency can refocus its energies to better serve its mission to protect competition going forward.

Cory S. Capps and Leemore Dafny: A Conversation on the Draft Merger Guidelines

Cory S. Capps and Leemore Dafny provide their round-one comments on the draft Merger Guidelines.

Carl Shapiro: Why Dropping Market Power from the Merger Guidelines Matters

Carl Shapiro provides his round-one comments on the draft Merger Guidelines.

The Problem with Political Antitrust

In new research, Nolan McCarty and Sepehr Shahshahani find that, contrary to the concerns of Neo-Brandeisians, Market et power does not correlate with political power via outsized lobbying.

Dennis Carlton: Have the Draft Guidelines Demoted Economics?

Dennis Carlton provides his round-one comments on the draft Merger Guidelines.

Latest news

Revising Guideline 6 With Evidence To Establish a Structural Inference for Input Foreclosure

Vertical merger law lacks the structural presumption of horizontal merger law, which shifts the burden from the government to the merging parties to provide evidence that a merger will not produce anticompetitive effects when it is known that the merger will substantially increase market concentration. To improve Guideline 6 of the draft Merger Guidelines concerning vertical foreclosure, Steven Salop develops a three-factor criteria with which the government antitrust agencies can show an analogous structural “inference” that shifts the burden of evidence to the merging parties.

How US Antitrust Enforcement Against Xerox Promoted Innovation by Japanese Competitors

Xerox invented modern copier technology and was so successful that its brand name became a verb. In 1972, U.S. antitrust authorities charged Xerox with monopolization and eventually ordered the licensing of all its copier-related patents. As new research by Robin Mamrak shows, this antitrust intervention promoted subsequent innovation in the copier industry, but only among Japanese competitors. Nevertheless, their innovations benefited U.S. consumers.

Revising the Merger Guidelines To Return Antitrust to a Sound Economic and Legal Foundation

The draft Merger Guidelines largely replace the consumer welfare standard of the Chicago School with the lessening of competition principle found in the 1914 Clayton Act. This shift would enable the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice Antitrust Division to utilize the full extent of modern economics to respond to rising concentration and its harmful effects, writes John Kwoka.

How Anthony Downs’s Analysis Explains Rational Voters’ Preferences for Populism

In new research, Cyril Hédoin and Alexandre Chirat use the rational-choice theory of economist Anthony Downs to explain how populism rationally arises to challenge established institutions of liberal democracy.

The Impact of Large Institutional Investors on Innovation Is Not as Positive as One Might Expect

In a new paper, Bing Guo, Dennis C. Hutschenreiter, David Pérez-Castrillo, and Anna Toldrà-Simats study how large institutional investors impact firm innovation. The authors find that large institutional investors encourage internal research and development but discourage firm acquisitions that would add patents and knowledge to their firms’ portfolios, hampering overall innovation.

The FTC Needs To Focus Arguments on Technological Transitions After High-Profile Losses

Joshua Gray and Cristian Santesteban argue that the Federal Trade Commission's focus in Meta-Within and Microsoft-Activision on narrow markets like VR fitness apps and consoles missed the boat on the real competition issue: the threat to future competition in nascent markets like VR platforms and cloud gaming.

We Need Better Research on the Relationship Between Market Power and Productivity in the Hospital Industry

Antitrust debates have largely ignored questions about the relationship between market power and productivity, and scholars have provided little guidance on the issue due to data limitations. However, data is plentiful on the hospital industry for both market power and operating costs and productivity, and researchers need to take advantage, writes David Ennis.