Series

The largest artificial intelligence firms are able to afford access to quality data from content producers like the New York Times, while smaller startups are being left out. This dynamic risks concentrating markets and creating unassailable barriers to entry. Compulsory licenses offer one solution to lower barriers to entry for nascent AI firms without harming content producers and consumers, writes Kristelia García.

Christian Peukert argues that the market for licensing content from copyright owners like newspapers or online forums requires a standardized regime if access to this data, used to train artificial intelligence models, is to remain available for more than just the largest AI firms. A failure to maintain non-discriminatory access will result in the consolidation of both the AI and content production markets.

Is there a world where AI developers could get the training data they need through content licensing deals? Matthew Sag argues that content licensing deals between developers of artificial intelligence and content owners are only possible for large content owners and cannot feasibly apply to the bulk of producers and owners of content on the internet.

Large AI firms like OpenAI and Amazon are licensing content to train their models that they might otherwise have been able to access for free under the fair use doctrine. Mark A. Lemley and Jacob Noti-Victor write that this behavior may constitute anticompetitive acquiescence—where large firms agree to license content they don’t have to in order to raise rivals’ costs.

Beatriz Kira argues that Brazil’s proposed digital competition bill shows how the Global South can strengthen regulation of Big Tech platforms without forfeiting competitiveness. Brazil’s efforts build on global models yet chart their own course and belie the false dichotomy between encouraging national business development and protecting competition and its benefits.

Laura Phillips-Sawyer writes that history shows that antitrust and industrial policy have often served as complements to one another. Industrial policy has succeeded when it has targeted specific industries to invest in their ability to compete, rather than protect them from competition.

Europe is acutely aware it has fallen behind competitively, but it is struggling to find a way to recover lost ground. Cristina Caffarra writes that Europe did not find any inspiration in the American anti-monopoly movement, which underpinned the whole-of-government approach of the Biden administration. It is also faltering in developing a response to the vigorous array of tools deployed by the Trump administration to assert power at home and on the world stage. It does not need to be this way, as Europe has tremendous assets and capabilities. But it needs investment and leadership, boldness and experimentation in vision and policy design. Policymakers are beginning to see the urgency, but there is still too much narrow defensive posture by regulators sticking to their patch.

Eleanor M. Fox and Harry First warn that global strategies and political pressures are undercutting the neutral, rule-of-law competition system.

Xavier Vives argues that to create firms that can compete on the international level, the European Union does not need to ease its merger regime or encourage market power. Rather, encouraging European market integration will allow firms to draw in investment and scale up their operations.

Chris Sagers suggests that something significant could be happening in antitrust, though it probably remains academic for now, and it is hidden behind political messaging that in recent times has gotten most of the attention. He argues that the populist or politicizing talk of antitrust leaders during both the present administration and the last one has grown more detached from real-world administration. But he argues that there may be real change going on behind the scenes, as expressed in positions among some conservatives and Republican office-holders. He argues that the libertarian orthodoxy of the Chicago School no longer defines “conservative” antitrust, and that the range of plausible disagreement may genuinely be changing.