Series

Government Influence in Accounting Rulemaking Has Led to Understated Costs and Worse Financial Outcomes

Municipal and state governments provide input to the organization that creates their accounting standards. Such input by stakeholders can be helpful, but their influence has produced some accounting rules that diverge from both economic reality and private sector rules. These deviations allow governments to understate budget liabilities, including pensions plans, and put at risk the financial health of states and cities across the United States.

The Surprising Culprit Behind Declining US Antitrust Enforcement

In contrast to a recent paper that argues the decline in antitrust enforcement over recent decades is due largely to the political influence of big business, Herbert Hovenkamp argues that small businesses and trade associations have historically had more influence over antitrust policy, often lobbying for less competition and higher prices.

Next-Generation Antitrust Policy in an AI-Driven World

Simonetta Vezzoso weighs in on the policy debate on algorithmic competition.

Can we Limit Algorithmic Coordination?

Michal Gal discusses the regulatory hurdles to deal with the impacts of algorithmic price collusion. In the meantime, she says, market fixes include algorithmic consumers and platform nudges to mitigate price coordination.

Pricing Algorithms Aren’t Colluding, Yet

Axel Gautier, Ashwin Ittoo, and Pieter van Cleynenbreugel write that the practice of pricing algorithms tacitly colluding remains theoretical for now, and technological obstacles render it very unlikely in the short term. However, regulators must still prepare for a future in which artificial intelligence achieves the necessary sophistication to collude.

Why We Don’t See Higher Use of Merger Simulations

Oliver Budzinski and Victoriia Noskova discuss in their publication why merger simulations are not more widely used by competition authorities and in front of the courts to predict future effects of mergers despite advancements in availability of data, AI and computational power. The institutional setting is an essential factor for computational antitrust tools to be accepted and applied by competition authorities.

What Can Policymakers Do About Algorithmic Collusion and Discrimination?

Maurice Stucke explains three policy approaches to algorithmic collusion and discrimination, and makes the case for a broader ecosystem approach that addresses not only the shortcomings of current antitrust law and merger review, but extends beyond them for a comprehensive policy response to the many risks associated with artificial intelligence.

Address Algorithmic Collusion with Compliance by Design

Daryl Lim explains that while there is some evidence that pricing algorithms facilitate collusion, there are reasons to be skeptical of their effectiveness. Lim advocates for compliance by design: firms should create algorithms that don’t collude on price, comply with reporting their algorithms transparently, and know that they will be held responsible for the actions the algorithm takes.

Can Computational Tools Revitalize Antitrust Enforcement?

Companies increasingly use sophisticated computational tools to compete, particularly in digital markets. Giovanna Massarotto outlines how antitrust agencies must similarly modernize and adopt advanced technologies to address complex antitrust enforcement challenges effectively and remain relevant.

AI For the Antitrust Regulator

Cary Coglianese lays out the potential, and the considerations, for antitrust regulators to use machine learning and artificial intelligence algorithms.

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