Eleanor Fox

Eleanor M. Fox is the Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation Emerita at New York University School of Law. She is an expert in antitrust and competition policy, and teaches, writes, and advises on competition policy in nations around the world and in international organizations. She has a special interest in developing countries, poverty, and inequality, and explores how opening markets and attacking privilege, corruption, and cronyism can alleviate marginalization and open paths to economic opportunity and inclusive development. Fox received her law degree from NYU School of Law in 1961; she received an honorary doctorate degree from the University of Paris-Dauphine in 2009. She was awarded an inaugural Lifetime Achievement Award in 2011 by the Global Competition Review for “substantial, lasting, and transformational impact on competition policy and practice.” She received the inaugural award for outstanding contributions to the international competition law community in 2015 by ASCOLA, the Academic Society for Competition Law. She is co-author with Mor Bakhoum, Making Markets Work for Africa (Oxford 2019), with Daniel Crane, Global Issues in Antitrust and Competition Law (2d ed. West 2017), and with Damien Gerard of EU Competition Law casebook (Elgar, 2nd ed. forthcoming 2023), and, with Daniel Crane, the casebook US Antitrust Law in Global Context (4th ed. West 2020).

“Consumer Welfare” and the Real Battle for the Soul of Antitrust

The Stigler Center’s 2023 Antitrust and Competition conference seeks to answer the question: what lays beyond the consumer welfare standard? In advance of the...

Latest news

Income Inequality May Worsen the Spread of Infectious Disease

Income inequality may exacerbate the spread of infectious diseases. In a new paper, Jay Bhattacharya, Joydeep Bhattacharya, and Min Kyong Kim examine the relationship between income inequality and the incidence and prevalence of tuberculosis across countries.

The Classic Theory of Albert O. Hirschman Argues Against the US Chamber’s Case for Non-Competes

Drawing on the theory of Albert O. Hirschman’s  Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Brian Callaci argues non-compete clauses stifle the important channels of communication between employees and businesses necessary for improving firm competitiveness. The evidence also shows that, despite claims from businesses, non-competes harm rather than reward employees for their loyalty. 

AI For the Antitrust Regulator

Cary Coglianese lays out the potential, and the considerations, for antitrust regulators to use machine learning and artificial intelligence algorithms.

Creation over Time in Copyright and Patent

On May 18, the United States Supreme Court decided two intellectual property cases with two seemingly different results. A closer look, however, reveals a complimentary concern with the monopolistic power of first movers and how the legal system should enable innovation from second movers over time, writes Randy Picker.

ESG Standards’ Good, Bad and Ugly

The Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State hosted a virtual event discussing the standards, metrics and disclosures of investments focused on Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) goals. The following is a transcript of the event.

Reregulate.

Lee Hepner and William J. McGee respond to Clifford Winston’s ProMarket piece asserting that further deregulation of the airline industry would resolve problems in the industry. Instead, the authors claim a return to regulation would produce better results for travelers.

A World With Far Fewer Mergers

Brooke Fox and Walter Frick analyze research and ideas presented at the Stigler Center Antitrust and Competition Conference that question the value of mergers.