Commentary

Has Antitrust Been Captured by Big Business Interests? It’s Not So Simple

Why has antitrust enforcement declined in the United States since the 1970s? Is it due to the preferences of voters, business influence, or an alternative explanation altogether? In this symposium, Jonathan Baker, Eleanor Fox, and Herbert Hovenkamp discuss the findings of Filippo Lancieri, Eric Posner, and Luigi Zingales’ new paper, “The Political Economy of the Decline of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States.” In this article, Baker critiques the big business capture theory the authors develop and suggests an alternative “settlement” theory to explain the shift toward weaker antitrust enforcement that began in the 1970s.

The Incredible Shrinking of Non-Cartel Antitrust

Eleanor Fox evaluates "The Political Economy of the Decline of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States" by Professors Lancieri, Posner, and Zingales, praising its revelations on the depth of corporate capture while challenging its narrative of judicial and regulatory dissembling on promises to uphold antitrust.

How Companies Should Combat Rage Farming Attempts

Alan D. Jagolinzer and Sander van der Linden highlight a dangerous trend of influencers who deliberately target corporations with disinformation, called “rage farming.” The authors use United Airlines to illustrate the damage this can cause to a business and argue that corporations should counter rage farming with proactive messaging rather than staying silent.

The Surprising Culprit Behind Declining US Antitrust Enforcement

In contrast to a recent paper that argues the decline in antitrust enforcement over recent decades is due largely to the political influence of big business, Herbert Hovenkamp argues that small businesses and trade associations have historically had more influence over antitrust policy, often lobbying for less competition and higher prices.

Deferred Bonuses as a Buffer Against Bank Failures

Hamid Mehran discusses proposals for reforming bankers' compensation to better align incentives and risk-taking. Mehran contends market-based, self-regulating compensation structures would enhance governance and financial stability more effectively than punitive bonus caps or clawbacks imposed by regulators.

The Trends That Will Define the Global Economy in 2024

Four economists discuss the trends in the global economy they are tracking in 2024

Epic v. Google Offers Courts Chance To Correct Course on “Right To Repair”

Following the Federal Trade Commission’s 2021 publication of “Nixing the Fix: An FTC Report to Congress on Repair Restrictions,” private “right to repair” cases have multiplied against companies that leverage their market power in a “primary equipment market” (e.g., tractors) to force their customers also to purchase their offerings in “aftermarkets” (e.g., tractor repairs) that otherwise would be competitive. Daniel McCuaig argues that the application of the 1992 Supreme Court decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. to these cases misunderstands that case and improperly shields monopolists from competitive pressures, including in Epic’s recent case against Apple.

The AI Trends That Will Define Society and Political Economy in 2024

Three artificial intelligence experts at the University of Chicago disclose the trends and issues regarding AI that they'll be watching for in 2024.

The 2023 Merger Guidelines Strengthen Enforcement by Finding Common Ground

Jonathan B. Baker provides his reactions to the final 2023 Merger Guidelines, including why they strengthen enforcement and where the antitrust enforcement agencies can further clarify their merger analysis.

The Digital Markets Act Is More Intricate Than Regulators and Detractors Give It Credit For

The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA), designed to regulate Big Tech, supplements current antitrust laws that pursue case-by-case analyses of business conduct with general rules to block potentially anticompetitive behaviors. Detractors criticize the DMA for its lack of nuance. Supporters applaud its general principles as a necessary bulwark against Big Tech’s market powers, which current case-by-case analysis has been unable to rein in. However, neither side appreciates the true complexity of the DMA or how its principles interact to prevent anticompetitive behavior, writes Alba Ribera Martínez.

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