Lucian Bebchuk and Robert Jackson discuss how Tesla is failing to bolster director independence despite a highly critical court opinion.

You can read here the first and second parts of their series of articles on Teslaโ€™s corporate governance.


As Tesla prepares for next weekโ€™s stockholder meeting, all eyes are on the boardโ€™s proposals to reincorporate in Texas and reinstate Elon Muskโ€™s massive stock option grant, which a Delaware judge invalidated in January. Insufficient attention, however, is being paid to the boardโ€™s failure to use the coming meeting to bolster board director independence and thereby address a serious problem stressed by the court decisions.

Directors that are independent from public-company executives provide a valuable benefit to investors, enabling the board to oversee and effectively compensate such executives in ways that would serve shareholder value. Thatโ€™s especially true at a company like Tesla, which has a โ€œsuperstar CEOโ€ with a significant stake. At such a company, the Delaware courts have explained, an โ€œindisputably independentโ€ director is needed to โ€œneutralizeโ€ the CEOโ€™s sway. However highly one values Musk and his talents, making the most of those gifts for public stockholders requires that directors who bargain with him over his pay be fully independent.

In 2018 Musk requested, and Teslaโ€™s board granted him, with stockholder approval, options to potentially acquire some 10% of Teslaโ€™s stock. After a trial, Delawareโ€™s chancellor concluded that all the directors on the boardโ€™s compensation committee lacked independence from Musk in light of the array of long personal and business relationships they had with Musk. Among other things, Musk and the โ€œleadโ€ director negotiating Muskโ€™s pay, the Chancellor said, โ€œspent the night at each otherโ€™s homes,โ€ โ€œvacationed together with their [] families,โ€ and โ€œspent Christmas together.โ€ These close ties made Teslaโ€™s directors the โ€œoppositeโ€ of the โ€œstaunchly independentโ€ board members needed to bargain with a powerful CEO.

Even the boardโ€™s chair, Robyn Denholm, lacked independence, the court concluded. The Tesla stock she received produced hundreds of millions of dollars for her, a majority of her overall wealth. Therefore, citing her testimony that her Tesla compensation was โ€œlife-changing,โ€ the court determined that she could not be independent from Musk.

And since Teslaโ€™s board โ€œrepeatedlyโ€ told investors in 2018 that the directors negotiating Muskโ€™s pay were independent, the chancellor concluded, the stockholder vote on the award had been uninformed and thus โ€œmeaningless.โ€ Indeed, the court explained, it was โ€œfalseโ€ for Tesla to โ€œdescribe key [directors] as independent.โ€

In light of the importance of director independence and the courtโ€™s disconcerting conclusions, Teslaโ€™s board should have accorded high priority to bolstering its independence in the aftermath of the courtโ€™s opinion. Given that the board made various key decisions between the courtโ€™s ruling and the issuance of the proxy statement for the coming meeting, one might have hoped to see on the boardโ€™s slate at least one candidate that could be viewed as โ€œindisputably independent.โ€ Surely there are highly qualified individuals that can meet that standard and would be willing to serve on Teslaโ€™s board.

But at next weekโ€™s meeting, no such new candidate is on the slate for stockholders to elect. On the slate are only two candidates that are existing directors: Kimbal Musk, the CEOโ€™s brother, and James Murdoch, the former CEO of 21st Century Fox who, the court noted, โ€œtook family vacations togetherโ€ with Musk. The court described its finding that these directors could not be independent from Musk a โ€œclear[] call.โ€

To be sure, Teslaโ€™s proxy statement for next weekโ€™s meeting describes the boardโ€™s view that, contrary to the courtโ€™s conclusions, all of the directors other than Muskโ€™s brother are independent. The proxy statement attaches the courtโ€™s ruling as an appendix for stockholders who wish to review it, but the statement does not substantively engage with the courtโ€™s analysis. In particular, the statement offers no specifics as to why the Tesla board drew from the same facts conclusions regarding independence that are so different from those of Delawareโ€™s chancellor.

The lack of independent directors has hobbled the Tesla boardโ€™s capacity for decision-makingโ€”even regarding next weekโ€™s meeting. To make certain decisions that were clearly independent of Musk, Teslaโ€™s board assembled a special committee with two members. Before the committee made any decisions, however, one of its two members stepped down because of his โ€œpersonal relationship with Elon Musk, as well as a potential business transaction […] with himโ€ that could lead to โ€œunfair attacks based on perceived conflicts of interest.โ€

This directorโ€™s departure left just one board member on the special committee, which decided to press forward with next weekโ€™s votes. But that director, like the chair of Teslaโ€™s board, has received โ€œa meaningful portion of her net worthโ€ from her Tesla compensation. The compensation for her other public-company roles seems to pale in comparison to her earnings at Tesla. Thus, based on the courtโ€™s reasoning about the effects of receiving life-changing compensation, there is reason to worry about her independence.

Notably, after the other directorโ€™s departure from the special committee, the committeeโ€™s sole remaining member discussed with the board chairperson โ€œthe possibility of accelerating the in-process search for new independent directors, and adding any new director(s) to the Committee.โ€ However, it was decided that the committeeโ€™s work would not wait until such new director(s) could be added. Thus, it seems that, since there was no addition of a new director, then there was no current director on the board that could have been added to the special committee who could be viewed as โ€œindisputably independentโ€ and thus not create the risk of a โ€œperceived conflict of interest.โ€

It is unusual for the board of a large public company to be unable to staff a special committee with more than one director who is indisputably independent from its CEO. That is all the more alarming in the case of a company that was the subject of a landmark judicial opinion placing a spotlight on problems arising from the lack of independence.

That decision found that key Tesla directors acted with a โ€œcontrolled mindsetโ€ and โ€œapproach[ed] negotiations seeming less intent on negotiating [with Musk] and more interested in achieving the result that [he] wanted.โ€ Such a finding could have, and should have, served as a wake-up call for Teslaโ€™s leaders. Unfortunately, Teslaโ€™s board seems to have chosen to ignore this call.

Authors’ Disclosures: Lucian Bebchuk is a professor of law, economics, and finance, and director of the corporate governance program, at Harvard Law School; and Robert Jackson is a professor of law at NYU School of Law who served as a Commissioner of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission from 2018 to 2020. They have served as independent experts on behalf of the plaintiff in the Delaware litigation regarding Muskโ€™s pay package. The post is part of a series of academic posts on Teslaโ€™s governance.

Articles represent the opinions of their writers, not necessarily those of the University of Chicago, the Booth School of Business, or its faculty.