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Regulatory Capture

When regulation protects narrow interests – usually the interests of the incumbent industry – at the expense of the public interest. Capture occurs in various ways: from straightforward bribes and threats, to more implicit quid pro quos such as the lucrative future employment (revolving door), to softer forms of cognitive/cultural capture.
“… as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.” George Stigler – The Theory of Economic Regulation (1971)

Commentary

Corporate Political Responsibility in a Captured Economy

Claudine Schneider
Most attention on corporate governance has focused on businesses’ social responsibility. Claudine Schneider and Ed Dolan write that businesses need to take into account...
Commentary

A Directorship at a Federal Reserve Bank is Good News for Banks, but May be Bad News for the Fed

Renée Adams
Far before the collapse of SVB, I provided systematic evidence that banks appear to benefit from their directorships on Federal Reserve Banks. The fact...
Regulation

Letters that Matter: How Interest Groups Shape Financial Legislation

Renée Adams
Members of Congress are inundated with an avalanche of correspondence on a daily basis. But what persuades them to heed the call? Recent research...
Industrial Policy

Industrial Policy Is a Seductive Mirage

Michael C. Munger
Industrial policy was once so out of fashion that it was jokingly called “the policy that shall not be named.” Now it’s back in...
News

The Mechanisms of Regulatory Capture

Filippo Lancieri
To mark the 50-year anniversary of George Stigler’s seminal piece, “The Theory of Economic Regulation” we are publishing a new eBook examining his theory’s...
News

Fear of Punishment Distorts Bank Financial Reporting

Hamid Mehran
When bank employees are afraid of punishment from regulators, they are likely to conceal information about their faulty decisions. This in turn distorts the...
News

Delaware: The State Where Companies Can Vote

Hal Weitzman
Adapted from What’s the Matter with Delaware: How the First State Has Favored the Rich, Powerful, and Criminal—and How It Costs Us All, published...
ESG, Corporate Governance & Future of the Firm

Are “Bankruptcy Directors” Bad for Creditors?

Jared Ellias
A new paper studies the rise of so-called “bankruptcy directors,” typically former bankruptcy lawyers, investment bankers, or distressed debt traders who join corporate boards...
News

Why Financial Regulations Might Fail to Produce Their Desired Outcome: The Case of the Capital Conservation Buffer

Hamid Mehran
The capital conservation buffer (CCB) was created after the 2008 financial crisis, instructing banks to retain their dividends in an escrow account and create a...
Antitrust and Competition

Big Tech, the FTC, and Ordoliberals: ProMarket’s Top Stories of 2021

ProMarket writers
As 2021 draws to a close, we look back at ProMarket’s most-read and most-widely shared stories of the past year. In a year marked by a...
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The publication of the Stigler Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business

ProMarket is dedicated to discussing how competition tends to be subverted by special interests. The posts represent the opinions of their writers, not necessarily those of the University of Chicago, the Booth School of Business, or its faculty. For more information, please visit ProMarket Policy.