When regulation protects narrow interests – usually the interests of the incumbent industry – at the expense of the public interest. Capture occurs in various ways: from straightforward bribes and threats, to more implicit quid pro quos such as the lucrative future employment (revolving door), to softer forms of cognitive/cultural capture.
“... as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.” George Stigler - The Theory of Economic Regulation (1971)
When a regulation’s benefits exceed its costs, simplicity and interdisciplinary processes are essential to reducing capture.
Regulatory capture arises when regulatory decisions advance private interests...
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