Filippo Lancieri

Filippo Lancieri is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the ETH Zurich Center for Law & Economics and a Research Fellow at the Stigler Center. Filippo’s research explores the challenges associated with regulation of digital markets, with an emphasis on the enforcement of antitrust and data protection policies. He is trained as a lawyer and an economist and his academic and professional experience spans the US, Europe and Brazil. His work has been published or forthcoming in The University of Chicago Law Review, the Antitrust Law Journal, The Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, The Journal of Competition Law and Economics, and The Stanford Journal of Law, Business and Finance, among others.

Lowering the Barriers to Entry for Economics Research in Healthcare

A new collection of scholarly work on the economics of the US healthcare sector is released today. The following is an adaptation...

Structuring a Structural Presumption for Merger Review

The consumer welfare standard can’t be saved with more theory. The problem is how it works in practice, and solving that means...

How to Design Data Protection Laws That Actually Work 

More and more countries are passing data protection laws, yet empirical studies show that these laws rarely deliver on their promises. A...

The Mechanisms of Regulatory Capture

To mark the 50-year anniversary of George Stigler’s seminal piece, “The Theory of Economic Regulation” we are publishing a new eBook examining...

Designing Better Antitrust Remedies for the Digital World

Even when antitrust enforcers and courts get it right when finding an anticompetitive infringement, they constantly end up imposing remedies that are...

Economic Regulation After George Stigler

George Stigler’s “The Theory of Economic Regulation” has left a lasting impact on the academic and real-world practice of regulatory policy. Fifty...

Revisiting Ohio vs. American Express: It’s Time for a More Nuanced Approach to Market Definition

Nearly three years ago, the Supreme Court decided the case of Ohio vs. American Express, which turned out to be one of...

“A Loaded Weapon”: Francis Fukuyama on the Political Power of Digital Platforms

In an interview with ProMarket, Francis Fukuyama discusses the political threat posed by digital platforms and why he believes a “middleware” solution...

How Does the House Antitrust Report on Digital Markets Compare to Others Around the World?

While the House Majority Report on digital platforms, published earlier this month, differs from other analyses both in terms of its structure...

Contextualizing the Dispute Between Australia, Facebook, and Google

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission's draft news media bargaining code for digital platforms has elicited aggressive responses from both Google and...

Latest news

Why Have Uninsured Depositors Become De Facto Insured?

Due to a change in how the FDIC resolves failed banks, uninsured deposits have become de facto insured. Not only is this dangerous for risk in the banking system, it is not what Congress intends the FDIC to do, writes Michael Ohlrogge.

Merger Law Reaches Acquirer Incentives and Private Equity Strategies

Steven C. Salop argues that Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers in which the acquiring firm’s unilateral incentives and business strategy are likely to lessen market competition.

Tim Wu Responds to Letter by Former Agency Chief Economists

Former special assistant to the president for technology and competition policy Tim Wu responds to the November 27 letter signed by former chief economists at the Federal Trade Commission and Justice Department Antitrust Division calling for a separation of the legal and economic analysis in the draft Merger Guidelines.

Can the Public Moderate Social Media?

ProMarket student editor Surya Gowda reviews the arguments made by Paul Gowder in his new book, The Networked Leviathan: For Democratic Platforms.

Uninhibited Campaign Donations Risks Creating Oligarchy

In new research, Valentino Larcinese and Alberto Parmigiani find that the 1986 Reagan tax cuts led to greater campaign spending from wealthy individuals, who benefited the most from this policy. The authors argue that a very permissive system of political finance, combined with the erosion of tax progressivity, created the conditions for the mutual reinforcement of economic and political disparities. The result was an inequality spiral hardly compatible with democratic ideals.

Did the Meme Stock Revolution Actually Change Anything?

Many financial commentators thought that the surge of retail investors participating in the stock market, the most notable of whom boosted “meme stocks” like GameStop, would democratize corporate governance and improve prosocial firm behavior, including the promotion of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) goals. In new research, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, and Yoon-Ho Alex Lee find evidence that the exact opposite took place.

The Kroger-Albertsons Merger Will Not Help Grocery Competition

Kroger and Albertsons say they need to merge to compete with Walmart. Claire Kelloway argues that what they really want is Walmart’s monopsony power, and permitting mergers on these grounds will only harm suppliers, workers, and consumers.