Fiona Scott Morton

Fiona M. Scott Morton is the Theodore Nierenberg Professor of Economics at the Yale University School of Management and an Adjunct Professor at Yale Law School. Her field of economics is Industrial Organization, the study of firms, markets, and competition. The focus of her research is the economics of competition policy and antitrust enforcement, as well as competition in healthcare markets. From 2011-12 Professor Scott Morton served as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economic Analysis (Chief Economist) at the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, where she helped enforce the nation’s antitrust laws. She frequently presents to government agencies tasked with enforcing competition law and is a Senior Fellow at Bruegel, the European policy think tank. At Yale SOM she teaches courses in competitive strategy and competition economics. She served as Associate Dean from 2007-10 and has won the School’s teaching award three times. At Yale Law School Professor Scott Morton teaches Antitrust Law. She founded and directs the Thurman Arnold Project at Yale, a vehicle to provide more competition policy programming to Yale students and the wider competition community. She holds a BA from Yale and a PhD from MIT, both in Economics, and has dual citizenship with the U.K.

The Pharmaceutical Benefits Manager Settlements Are a Novel Advance for the FTC and Competition Enforcement

In February, the Federal Trade Commission settled with pharmaceutical benefits manager (PBM) Express Scripts. The FTC had sued Express Scripts and two other large PBMs under the long dormant Section 5 of the FTC Act, which targets “unfair methods of competition.” The settlement suggests that the FTC may succeed in addressing the convoluted contracts between PBMs, drug manufacturers, health insurers, and employers that drive up drug prices for Americans. It also opens unchartered territory for antitrust enforcement and the limits of Section 5, argue Fiona Scott Morton and Mariah Smith.

How To Secure an Epic Win for Consumer Choice on Android Phones

For the first time in the history of mobile phones, Americans will be able to access a variety of app stores on Android phones, following game developer Epic Games’ legal victory over Google. Fiona Scott Morton and Nick Jacobson discuss how Google may try to undermine the court’s remedies to stifle competition and how both American and European regulators can respond to protect competition.

Google Search’s Exclusivity Payments Must Be Capped

Judge Amit Mehta will shortly provide his remedy to Google’s monopoly in internet search. Fiona Scott Morton and Paul Heidhues argue that the remedy must include a cap on Google’s payments to the mobile phone manufacturers, carriers, and web browsers that propelled its monopoly. Because any outright ban risks harming Google’s current partners in the short term, Judge Mehta should consider pursuing a flexible ban that instead limits the revenue these partners can receive from Google in order to encourage market entry and competition.

A Pro-Competitive Handbook for Policymakers to Unlock Digital Competition

Fiona Scott Morton introduces her new book on how regulators and policymakers can promote competition and fairness in digital markets.

Can the FTC’s PBM Complaint Create a Competitive Pharmaceutical Marketplace?

Fiona Scott Morton reviews the merits of the Federal Trade Commission’s complaint against the three largest pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) for suppressing competition in pharmaceutical markets. Although the complaint’s alleged harms are narrow, it is a welcome start that promises to shed light on the PBM’s expansive anticompetitive practices and ultimately lower drug prices for Americans.

Market Power Has Grown and Antitrust Needs Strengthening, Despite What Shapiro & Yurukoglu and Miller Suggest

Jonathan B. Baker and Fiona Scott Morton challenge the interpretations of two new papers from Carl Shapiro & Ali Yurukoglu and Nathan Miller, which question economy-wide trends toward a rise in market power and, if any such trend has occurred, that it is due to lax antitrust enforcement.

Antitrust Enforcers Must Act Now To Ensure the Google Search Case Delivers on Its Promise

Fiona Scott Morton and David Dinielli show how landmark antitrust cases historically have cleared the path for innovation in the next “frontier technology.” But with closing arguments in the search monopoly case just days away, Google threatens to evade this round of rigorous new competition. It reportedly is in talks to place its own artificial intelligence tool on Apple devices as it did in the case of search. Such a maneuver would entrench Google’s search monopoly and place Google in the driver’s seat to steer the development of consumer-facing AI. The authors offer up a menu of steps the government might take now to thwart Google’s new anticompetitive strategy and preserve competition in AI before it’s too late.

At Stake in the Apple Case Is Foregone and Future Innovation

Fiona Scott Morton provides her initial thoughts on the Department of Justice’s lawsuit against Apple, how it compares to current and past tech cases, and the arguments she anticipates each side will make.

What We Learn About the Behavioral Economics of Defaults From the Google Search Monopolization Case

At the heart of the United States Google Search case is the monopolizing effect of Google securing for its own search offering the status of default search engine on a web browser, such as Safari, Chrome, or Firefox. The authors review the behavioral economics and empirical evidence of this effect and suggest several conduct and structural remedies to open up the search market to competition.

The New and Improved 2023 Merger Guidelines

The final version of the Agencies’ Merger Guidelines are a thoughtful improvement over the draft version, writes Fiona Scott Morton. Both the economic and legal analysis in the final version promise to more effectively prevent harmful mergers and bring U.S. antitrust into the modern age.

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