Jonathan B. Baker

Jonathan B. Baker is Professor of Law, Emeritus, at the American University Washington College of Law and a senior academic advisor for the Thurman Arnold Project at Yale University. He specializes in the areas of antitrust and economic regulation. Professor Baker served as the Chief Economist of the Federal Communications Commission from 2009 to 2011, and as the Director of the Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission from 1995 to 1998. Previously, he worked as a Senior Economist at the President’s Council of Economic Advisers, Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, an Assistant Professor at Dartmouth's Amos Tuck School of Business Administration, an Attorney Advisor to the Acting Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, and an antitrust lawyer in private practice. Professor Baker is the author of The Antitrust Paradigm, the co-author of an antitrust casebook, a past Editorial Chair of Antitrust Law Journal, and a past member of the Council of the American Bar Association’s Section of Antitrust Law. He has published widely in the fields of antitrust law, policy, and economics. Professor Baker has received the Jerry S. Cohen Award for Antitrust Scholarship, American University’s Faculty Award for Outstanding Scholarship, Research, and Other Professional Accomplishments, and the Federal Trade Commission’s Award for Distinguished Service. He has a J.D. from Harvard and a Ph.D. in economics from Stanford University.

Has Antitrust Been Captured by Big Business Interests? It’s Not So Simple

Why has antitrust enforcement declined in the United States since the 1970s? Is it due to the preferences of voters, business influence, or an alternative explanation altogether? In this symposium, Jonathan Baker, Eleanor Fox, and Herbert Hovenkamp discuss the findings of Filippo Lancieri, Eric Posner, and Luigi Zingales’ new paper, “The Political Economy of the Decline of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States.” In this article, Baker critiques the big business capture theory the authors develop and suggests an alternative “settlement” theory to explain the shift toward weaker antitrust enforcement that began in the 1970s.

The 2023 Merger Guidelines Strengthen Enforcement by Finding Common Ground

Jonathan B. Baker provides his reactions to the final 2023 Merger Guidelines, including why they strengthen enforcement and where the antitrust enforcement agencies can further clarify their merger analysis.

Why the Political Misuse of Antitrust Must be Prevented

Misuse of antitrust for partisan purposes violates a norm intended to insulate enforcement from direct political influence and discourage politicians from exploiting enforcement decisions...

How Reforming Antitrust Can Restore a Competitive Economy

For decades, competition in America has been on the wane, leading to slower economic growth and a gaping chasm of inequality. Antitrust can help...

Market Power or Just Scale Economies?

While increased economies of scale may offer a partial explanation for higher margins and declining dynamism in the US economy, growing market power provides...

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