Anna Tzanaki
Anna Tzanaki is a Senior Lecturer at Lund University, Faculty of Law (Sweden), and Senior Research Fellow at UCL Centre of Law, Economics & Society (UK). She studied law at University College London (PhD), University of Chicago (LLM), University of Athens (LLB) and Humboldt University Berlin (Erasmus). She was a Visiting Research Fellow at Harvard Law School and a Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute. She is an Associate Editor of the Journal of Competition Law & Economics (Oxford) and Competition Policy International (Boston).
Her research and teaching focuses on M&A, competition law and policy, corporate governance, law & economics, EU and comparative law. Under an EU Marie Curie research grant, she had been investigating the competition implications of partial ownership of rival firms in Europe. She has a forthcoming monograph on this topic with Cambridge University Press, and she is also co-editor of a new Research Handbook on Competition and Corporate Law (Edward Elgar Publishing). Anna has been engaged as an external academic expert by the European Commission (DG COMP) and the Hellenic Competition Commission on several occasions.
Antitrust and Competition
Gauging Common Ownership in Fintech Markets
A new empirical paper estimates the scope and impact of common ownership in fintech markets. The authors find limited common ownership among...
Antitrust and Competition
The Passive Mechanisms of Common Ownership
A new paper explores the conundrum that common ownership poses for antitrust enforcers and competition and corporate scholars and sheds light on...
Latest news
Antitrust and Competition
Revising Guideline 6 With Evidence To Establish a Structural Inference for Input Foreclosure
Vertical merger law lacks the structural presumption of horizontal merger law, which shifts the burden from the government to the merging parties to provide evidence that a merger will not produce anticompetitive effects when it is known that the merger will substantially increase market concentration. To improve Guideline 6 of the draft Merger Guidelines concerning vertical foreclosure, Steven Salop develops a three-factor criteria with which the government antitrust agencies can show an analogous structural “inference” that shifts the burden of evidence to the merging parties.
Antitrust and Competition
How US Antitrust Enforcement Against Xerox Promoted Innovation by Japanese Competitors
Xerox invented modern copier technology and was so successful that its brand name became a verb. In 1972, U.S. antitrust authorities charged Xerox with monopolization and eventually ordered the licensing of all its copier-related patents. As new research by Robin Mamrak shows, this antitrust intervention promoted subsequent innovation in the copier industry, but only among Japanese competitors. Nevertheless, their innovations benefited U.S. consumers.
Antitrust and Competition
Revising the Merger Guidelines To Return Antitrust to a Sound Economic and Legal Foundation
The draft Merger Guidelines largely replace the consumer welfare standard of the Chicago School with the lessening of competition principle found in the 1914 Clayton Act. This shift would enable the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice Antitrust Division to utilize the full extent of modern economics to respond to rising concentration and its harmful effects, writes John Kwoka.
Economic History
How Anthony Downs’s Analysis Explains Rational Voters’ Preferences for Populism
In new research, Cyril Hédoin and Alexandre Chirat use the rational-choice theory of economist Anthony Downs to explain how populism rationally arises to challenge established institutions of liberal democracy.
Antitrust and Competition
The Impact of Large Institutional Investors on Innovation Is Not as Positive as One Might Expect
In a new paper, Bing Guo, Dennis C. Hutschenreiter, David Pérez-Castrillo, and Anna Toldrà-Simats study how large institutional investors impact firm innovation. The authors find that large institutional investors encourage internal research and development but discourage firm acquisitions that would add patents and knowledge to their firms’ portfolios, hampering overall innovation.
Antitrust and Competition
The FTC Needs To Focus Arguments on Technological Transitions After High-Profile Losses
Joshua Gray and Cristian Santesteban argue that the Federal Trade Commission's focus in Meta-Within and Microsoft-Activision on narrow markets like VR fitness apps and consoles missed the boat on the real competition issue: the threat to future competition in nascent markets like VR platforms and cloud gaming.
Commentary
We Need Better Research on the Relationship Between Market Power and Productivity in the Hospital Industry
Antitrust debates have largely ignored questions about the relationship between market power and productivity, and scholars have provided little guidance on the issue due to data limitations. However, data is plentiful on the hospital industry for both market power and operating costs and productivity, and researchers need to take advantage, writes David Ennis.
