regulatory capture
Term-Limited Leaders Are More likely To Respond to Financial Crises by Helping Banks—and Themselves—Over the Public
Financial crises routinely trigger sweeping overhauls of financial regulation, but whose interests do these reforms serve? In new research, Orkun Saka, Yuemei Ji, and Clement Minaudier find that political leaders facing term limits are much more likely to respond to financial crises by introducing reforms that benefit banks over the public or long-term financial stability. This phenomenon occurs more frequently in countries where the revolving door between politics and finance is common.
Antitrust Policy Can Be Captured Without Lobbying
In new research, Nicholas Short, Sophie Hill, and Jacob Brown examine "ideological capture": regulatory capture that works not through lobbying but through experts defining what goals and values regulators may consider. Surveying the public alongside antitrust lawyers, they find the consumer welfare standard marginalizes important public concerns, like the risk of increased layoffs or more lobbying power.
Wealth Buys Power, but Americans Are Focused on the Wrong Wealthy
Matthew Lucky reviews The Everywhere Millionaire: Who Is Really Rich in America and How They Got There by Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick, now out at Henry Holt and Co.
When Should Corporate Lobbying Trigger EU Competition Scrutiny?
In new research, Francisco E. Beneke Avila proposes a multifactor test to distinguish between the legitimate exercise of the right to lobbying and efforts to capture areas of public policy. He argues that the latter is an abuse of the firm’s political rights that can justify the intervention of EU competition authorities when corporate political activity leads to a lessening of competition.
Kevin Warsh’s Nomination Solidifies Wall Street’s Grip on the Federal Reserve
If confirmed, Kevin Warsh would be the latest Federal Reserve chair whose career took place primarily on Wall Street rather than in academia. The ascent of Wall Street veterans in the Fed risks skewing monetary policy to favor large investors and the wealthiest, writes Franny Philos Sophia.
The Politics of Fragmentation and Capture in AI Regulation
In new research, Filippo Lancieri, Laura Edelson, and Stefan Bechtold explore how the political economy of artificial intelligence regulation is shaped by the strategic behavior of governments, technology companies, and other agents.
Delaware’s SB21 Continues 150 Years of Corporate Power and Regulatory Capture
Christina M. Sautter writes that the passage of Senate Bill 21, which rebalances power away from shareholders to corporate management, represents a 150-year-long development in corporate law spurred by regulatory capture that has removed countless restrictions on firm behavior.
China Is Using Its Market Power To Influence Foreign Policymaking
Audrye Wong writes that China is able to use its market power to pressure foreign companies and business leaders—perhaps most notably Tesla CEO Elon Musk—to lobby on its behalf. The practice raises questions about foreign influence in American and European policymaking and the disproportionate clout of business and oligarchic interests.
The Deafening Silence of Big Business in Washington
Wendy Li writes that business leaders must rediscover past unity and put pressure on politicians to defend against President Donald Trump’s attacks on businesses and civil society and prevent democratic backsliding.
The False Crisis Pushing Delaware to Surrender Shareholder Rights
Delaware lawmakers are being pressured to pass SB 21, a bill that would weaken shareholder protections and reduce judicial oversight of corporations. Alan Jagolinzer,...
