In new research, David Hall, Benjamin Hansen, and Kyutaro Matsuzawa find that decriminalization efforts in Oregon and Washington reduced the number of drug-related arrests, but also led to additional overdose deaths.
In new research, Patrice Bougette, Frédéric Marty, and Simone Vannuccini propose that competition authorities add a conditional fine to antitrust cases that is activated when behavioral remedies are no longer effective.
The Digital Markets Act establishes central rules and enforcement for digital platforms across the European Union, but allows decentralized private enforcement on the national level. In new research, Lena Hornkohl and Barbara Justen reflect on how two recent German court cases show how national litigation can make the DMA more effective, but also highlight the need for mechanisms that aid in consistent interpretation.
Jeremy Pilaar and Albert (Haotian) Wang present the weaknesses in current legislative reforms targeting pharmacy benefit managers. They suggest that lawmakers focus on reining in PBM income, limiting fees that PBMs can charge, and empowering state legislative efforts.
Alberto Heimler argues that antitrust authorities should focus on whether market power allows one party to exploit relationship-specific sunk investments made by another and how that undermines potential innovation, investments, and competition.
In new research, Annette Alstadsæter, Niels Johannesen, Ségal Le Guern Herry & Gabriel Zucman find that Norwegian households that become wealthy today are much less likely to adopt offshore tax evasion strategies under modern high-transparency standards.
In new research, Tingting Song examines how FRAND principles typically used to discipline excessive or discriminatory terms in SEP licensing can be applied to data brokers in data licensing.
Artificial intelligence agents are beginning to interact in ways that create risks beyond individual misalignment with corporate and social expectations. As happened with global finance after the 2007 crisis, AI governance needs to begin focusing on how good agents can still produce bad systems.
Wealth taxes can make capital markets more efficient when they are optimally combined with lower capital gains taxes, argue Sergio Ocampo, Guttorm Schjelderup, and Floris Zoutman in new research.
Anticompetitive behavior, such as consolidation, in the health-insurance industry has allowed a small group of insurers to dominate the market. One of the main drivers of this behavior is “adverse selection,” where individuals know more about how sick they are than insurance companies do. To mitigate the risk of paying out more claims than they can cover, insurers often raise their premiums. Kellogg’s Amanda Starc and her colleague argue that, to create a truly healthy health-insurance marketplace, regulators and policymakers need a framework for rethinking the complex interactions between adverse selection and regulatory guardrails.