Regulation

In new research, Niuniu Zhang discusses how regulators can add “noise” to market data to preclude tacit collusion through algorithmic pricing software without hampering legitimate market practices.

Jérémie Haese and Christian Peukert present new empirical findings on core open source technologies for the web and AI. Open source holds promise for making AI systems more transparent and secure, but it risks masking continued centralized control under the guise of openness.

In new research, Vikas Agarwal, Juan-Pedro Gómez, Kasra Hosseini, and Manish Jha explore how companies reward executives for meeting sustainability targets. They evaluate how ESG metrics to determine executive pay create tradeoffs with traditional financial incentives, and what that means for the future of ESG goals.

Roslyn Layton examines the recent Amazon Web Services outage and compares it with last year’s CrowdStrike outage to illustrate differences in scope, responsibility, and systemic impact. She argues that cloud providers should contribute to the Universal Service Fund, ensuring financial contribution to resilience and critical infrastructure for essential services.

Many studies have assumed that United States tariff costs are passed onto consumers. In new research, Vanessa Alviarez, Michele Fioretti, Ken Kikkawa, and Monica Morlacco argue that buyer-seller relationship dynamics allow dominant U.S. importers to instead force higher costs onto exporters.

States are beginning to impose idiosyncratic rules on artificial intelligence chatbots and other offerings in response to harms to consumers. Rather than create a...

Elizabeth Pollman reviews barriers for holding corporations and their fiduciaries accountable under corporate and securities law.

In new research, Tomaso Duso, Joseph Harrington, Carl Kreuzberg, and Geza Sapi demonstrate how their screening tool can aid antitrust authorities in identifying potential collusion between firms through public communications.

In new research, Adam Callister, Andrew Granato, and Belisa Pang argue that differing incentives faced by plaintiffs and defendants in “battles of the experts” litigation (like securities suits) leads to structurally higher spending by defendants on expert witnesses. These incentives also apply to any class action suit and many individual suits. They argue that courts should take this dynamic into account and correspondingly be more aggressive in using authority to employ court-appointed experts.

Corporations can sidestep prosecution by cooperating with the government and offering up employees to avoid their own criminal liability. Ellen S. Podgor discusses two prominent reasons why the current approach to corporate criminality is inefficient.