In new research, Semih Üslü and Flavien Moreau argue that waves of mergers and acquisition, which are typically unstable and ultimately crash, are not driven by changes in economic conditions, but by self-reinforcing appetite for mergers among firms when others are also engaging in M&A. Policies that drive stable, low-merger conditions can lead to better outcomes for consumers.
Are the antitrust enforcement agencies in the United States sufficiently stringent in challenging mergers? In a new working paper, Vivek Bhattacharya, Gastón Illanes, and David Stillerman inform this debate by examining the price and quantity effects of U.S. retail mergers and modeling the implications of alternative antitrust regimes.
The Supreme Court’s 1962 Brown Shoe decision, which found a merger to be anticompetitive even though it would have reduced prices for consumers, remains...
The Stigler Center’s 2023 Antitrust and Competition conference seeks to answer the question: what lays beyond the consumer welfare standard? In advance of the...
As the federal antitrust agencies consider revising the merger guidelines, they should add consideration of the merging parties’ previous bad acts, write Michael A....
The widely accepted Cournot effect assumes that the merger of complementary firms benefits downstream firms and consumers (in addition to the merged firms themselves)...
A 2000 amendment to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act made it easier for firms to merge without notifying US antitrust authorities. In new research, Giovanni Morzenti...
On Sept. 19, a federal judge approved UnitedHealth Group’s acquisition of Change Healthcare over the concerns of the U.S. Department of Justice. The judge’s...
In trying to get their merger approved, Penguin and Simon & Schuster claimed massive, but unverified cost savings. They also have promised that their...
As currently formulated, antitrust’s rule of reason approach is not the best tool to deal with vertical noncompete agreements that limit worker mobility and...