Mergers
Is US Antitrust Policy Too Lenient?
Are the antitrust enforcement agencies in the United States sufficiently stringent in challenging mergers? In a new working paper, Vivek Bhattacharya, Gastón Illanes, and David Stillerman inform this debate by examining the price and quantity effects of U.S. retail mergers and modeling the implications of alternative antitrust regimes.
Did the Supreme Court Fix “Brown Shoe”?
The Supreme Court’s 1962 Brown Shoe decision, which found a merger to be anticompetitive even though it would have reduced prices for consumers, remains...
The Reasonable Competitive Conduct Standard for Antitrust
The Stigler Center’s 2023 Antitrust and Competition conference seeks to answer the question: what lays beyond the consumer welfare standard? In advance of the...
Why the Antitrust Agencies Should Consider Prior Bad Acts in Merger Review
As the federal antitrust agencies consider revising the merger guidelines, they should add consideration of the merging parties’ previous bad acts, write Michael A....
A New Merger Tool Protects Consumers from Limits of the Cournot Effect
The widely accepted Cournot effect assumes that the merger of complementary firms benefits downstream firms and consumers (in addition to the merged firms themselves)...
Antitrust Deregulation is Undermining Innovation
A 2000 amendment to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act made it easier for firms to merge without notifying US antitrust authorities. In new research, Giovanni Morzenti...
How the Wrong Presumptions Led to the Wrong Conclusions in the United/Change Healthcare Merger
On Sept. 19, a federal judge approved UnitedHealth Group’s acquisition of Change Healthcare over the concerns of the U.S. Department of Justice. The judge’s...
When Rhetoric Confronts Economic Reality: Unsupported Efficiency Claims and Unenforceable Promises Cannot Save the Book Publishers Deal
In trying to get their merger approved, Penguin and Simon & Schuster claimed massive, but unverified cost savings. They also have promised that their...
Antitrust and the FTC: Franchise Restraints on Worker Mobility
As currently formulated, antitrust’s rule of reason approach is not the best tool to deal with vertical noncompete agreements that limit worker mobility and...
The FTC Was Correct to Withdraw the Vertical Merger Guidelines
The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines, now withdrawn by the FTC, did not represent sound merger policy, argues Steven Salop; rather, they were overly defendant-friendly...
