Lobbying

Antitrust Policy Can Be Captured Without Lobbying

In new research, Nicholas Short, Sophie Hill, and Jacob Brown examine "ideological capture": regulatory capture that works not through lobbying but through experts defining what goals and values regulators may consider. Surveying the public alongside antitrust lawyers, they find the consumer welfare standard marginalizes important public concerns, like the risk of increased layoffs or more lobbying power.

When Should Corporate Lobbying Trigger EU Competition Scrutiny? 

In new research, Francisco E. Beneke Avila proposes a multifactor test to distinguish between the legitimate exercise of the right to lobbying and efforts to capture areas of public policy. He argues that the latter is an abuse of the firm’s political rights that can justify the intervention of EU competition authorities when corporate political activity leads to a lessening of competition. 

Why Big Business Loves Costly Regulations   

In new research, Luca Macedoni and Ariel Weinberger argue that large firms are more likely to lobby in favor of strict industry regulations when they can reduce competition by imposing high fixed costs on smaller, less-profitable firms.

The Myth That Lobbying and Campaign Giving Are the Same

In new research, Alexander Furnas, Timothy LaPira, and Clare Brock find that most politically active organizations engage in either campaign contributions or lobbying, but rarely both.The findings have implications for regulation and future academic research.

The Deafening Silence of Big Business in Washington

Wendy Li writes that business leaders must rediscover past unity and put pressure on politicians to defend against President Donald Trump’s attacks on businesses and civil society and prevent democratic backsliding.

The Surprising Reason Most Firms Don’t Lobby

Benjamin Egerod explores the information gap that prevents a majority of firms from lobbying. He argues that the lack of lobbying participation from a majority of firms creates a lopsided playing field that gives more power to those that do.

Global Giants Team Up to Control Trade Policy

Hao Zhang examines how global value chain partnerships among large, monopolistic firms in the US enable new forms of political coordination and coalition-building to influence trade policy in their favor, despite popular backlash against globalization.

The Problem with Political Antitrust

In new research, Nolan McCarty and Sepehr Shahshahani find that, contrary to the concerns of Neo-Brandeisians, Market et power does not correlate with political power via outsized lobbying.

Defense Contracts Are Going to the Best Connected, Not Necessarily the Best

In new research, Åženay AÄŸca and Deniz Igan use the shock of the September 11 attacks and declaration of war on Afghanistan to show...

Fighting New Antitrust Rules Is a Bad Move for Big Tech

With new limits on platforms taking effect in the EU and U.S. politicians showing greater willingness to defy tech titans, companies would do better...

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