lobby

The Price of Democracy: a Webinar with Julia Cagé, Andrea Prat, and Guy Rolnik

At this trying time, there is a particularly high demand for reliable and trustworthy information. To address this demand by Booth students, alumni, faculty,...

Samsung and the Political Power of South Korean Chaebols: a Webinar with Sangin Park and Guy Rolnik

The Stigler Center’s 2020 Antitrust and Competition Conference will discuss the interconnection between monopolies and politics. Our pre-conference Webinar Series explores the extent to which firms can leverage...

“Democracy Is Influenced by Lobbyists, That’s Why the People Also Need Someone to Lobby for Them”

“Individuals usually don’t have enough incentive to take action, even though it is clear they will be collectively better off by taking action.” In...

MBA Students Against Corporate America: “Stop Lobbying the White House on the Defense Production Act”

Since the virus outbreak, the US Chamber of Commerce has lobbied the federal government to limit the use of a piece of legislation that...

Can Google Mobilize Its Users to Lobby Elected Officials?

Google has an 87 percent market share in the search business and the potential to mobilize more voters than the Democratic primaries, according to...

If Journalists Want to Save Journalism, They Should Stop Asking Google for Money

A new report claims Google has been using its Google News Initiative to stage a “media takeover” and reveals the increasing influence of the...

LATEST NEWS

How US Antitrust Enforcement Against Xerox Promoted Innovation by Japanese Competitors

Xerox invented modern copier technology and was so successful that its brand name became a verb. In 1972, U.S. antitrust authorities charged Xerox with monopolization and eventually ordered the licensing of all its copier-related patents. As new research by Robin Mamrak shows, this antitrust intervention promoted subsequent innovation in the copier industry, but only among Japanese competitors. Nevertheless, their innovations benefited U.S. consumers.

Revising the Merger Guidelines To Return Antitrust to a Sound Economic and Legal Foundation

The draft Merger Guidelines largely replace the consumer welfare standard of the Chicago School with the lessening of competition principle found in the 1914 Clayton Act. This shift would enable the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice Antitrust Division to utilize the full extent of modern economics to respond to rising concentration and its harmful effects, writes John Kwoka.

How Anthony Downs’s Analysis Explains Rational Voters’ Preferences for Populism

In new research, Cyril Hédoin and Alexandre Chirat use the rational-choice theory of economist Anthony Downs to explain how populism rationally arises to challenge established institutions of liberal democracy.

The Impact of Large Institutional Investors on Innovation Is Not as Positive as One Might Expect

In a new paper, Bing Guo, Dennis C. Hutschenreiter, David Pérez-Castrillo, and Anna Toldrà-Simats study how large institutional investors impact firm innovation. The authors find that large institutional investors encourage internal research and development but discourage firm acquisitions that would add patents and knowledge to their firms’ portfolios, hampering overall innovation.

The FTC Needs To Focus Arguments on Technological Transitions After High-Profile Losses

Joshua Gray and Cristian Santesteban argue that the Federal Trade Commission's focus in Meta-Within and Microsoft-Activision on narrow markets like VR fitness apps and consoles missed the boat on the real competition issue: the threat to future competition in nascent markets like VR platforms and cloud gaming.