Interview Series: How Incomplete is the Theory of the Firm?

"Current Populist Discontent Seems Mainly Driven by a Fear of Change and Uncertainty"

In the final installment of ProMarket’s interview series on the economic theory of the firm, we ask Princeton University professor Alan Blinder and University of...

“The Sense That the System Is Rigged Relates to Governments' Failure to Address Inequality and Concentration”

In this installment of ProMarket’s interview series on the economic theory of the firm, we ask Stanford professor Anat Admati about the role of corporations and governments...

"No Mistake About it: A Revolt Against Globalization is Underway!"

In this installment of ProMarket’s new interview series, Columbia Law School’s John C. Coffee Jr. shares some thoughts on political engagement by corporations. "Milton Friedman seems...

"Political Engagement by Corporations Derives from and is Focused on Seeking Monopolistic Power"

In this installment of ProMarket’s new interview series, Harvard Business School professor emeritus Joseph Bower shares some thoughts on rent-seeking, politics, and the role of corporations...

“So Long As Corporate Managers See Their Objective as Maximizing Returns, Rent-Seeking and Regulatory Capture Will Persist”

In this installment of ProMarket’s new interview series on the economic theory of the firm, Harvard Business School professor Lynn Paine discusses the role of corporations and...

“The Ability of Companies to Subvert the Operating Rules for the Market is a Deep, Systematic, Durable Force”

In this installment of ProMarket’s new interview series, we ask Harvard Business School professor Herman "Dutch" Leonard about the involvement of corporations in politics...

“Under President Trump and the Republican Congress, Banks Will Have Even More Ability to Write Regulations That Favor Them”

In this installment of ProMarket’s new interview series on the economic theory of the firm, we ask University of Connecticut law professor and blogger James Kwak if...

Bengt Holmstrom: "I'm More Concerned About the Economic Power of the Most Valuable Companies Than Their Political Power"

In this installment of ProMarket’s new interview series, Nobel laureate Bengt Holmstrom says “this may be the right time to look at political engagement...

“Political Engagement by Corporations Would Be Far Down the List of Forces Responsible for Popular Discontent”

The third installment in ProMarket’s new interview series on the economic theory of the firm. In this installment, we ask Chicago Booth’s Steven Kaplan...

Theory of the Firm Interview Series: John Van Reenen

The second installment in ProMarket’s new interview series: Should the economic theory of the firm be modified? If so, how? In this installment, we...

LATEST NEWS

Why Have Uninsured Depositors Become De Facto Insured?

Due to a change in how the FDIC resolves failed banks, uninsured deposits have become de facto insured. Not only is this dangerous for risk in the banking system, it is not what Congress intends the FDIC to do, writes Michael Ohlrogge.

Merger Law Reaches Acquirer Incentives and Private Equity Strategies

Steven C. Salop argues that Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers in which the acquiring firm’s unilateral incentives and business strategy are likely to lessen market competition.

Tim Wu Responds to Letter by Former Agency Chief Economists

Former special assistant to the president for technology and competition policy Tim Wu responds to the November 27 letter signed by former chief economists at the Federal Trade Commission and Justice Department Antitrust Division calling for a separation of the legal and economic analysis in the draft Merger Guidelines.

Can the Public Moderate Social Media?

ProMarket student editor Surya Gowda reviews the arguments made by Paul Gowder in his new book, The Networked Leviathan: For Democratic Platforms.

Uninhibited Campaign Donations Risks Creating Oligarchy

In new research, Valentino Larcinese and Alberto Parmigiani find that the 1986 Reagan tax cuts led to greater campaign spending from wealthy individuals, who benefited the most from this policy. The authors argue that a very permissive system of political finance, combined with the erosion of tax progressivity, created the conditions for the mutual reinforcement of economic and political disparities. The result was an inequality spiral hardly compatible with democratic ideals.