Antitrust and labor

In new research, Norman Bishara and Lorenzo Luisetto analyze the nature and proliferation of state legislative activity to regulate noncompete agreements since 2009. In the absence of a federal rule, these developments represent a promising step toward curbing the abuse of noncompete agreements.

In new research, Axel Gottfries and Gregor Jarosch develop a model to understand how wage-fixing cartels operate and show how to gauge the harm they cause to workers.

Jan Broulík writes that the interest and willingness of European competition authorities and courts to intervene in markets to protect labor has made critical strides over the last few months. However, it still has a ways to go to even catch up with its American counterpart.

The Federal Trade Commission under Chair Andrew Ferguson has surprised many by continuing its predecessor’s emphasis on protecting labor markets. Randy Kim writes that while this is a welcome development, it will do little to help workers if President Donald Trump does not also continue his predecessor’s whole-of-government approach. Early indications suggest he will not.

Steven C. Salop recommends that the next presidential administration continue to focus competition policy on protecting against adverse labor market outcomes. He suggests several policies the administration might pursue to achieve these benefits.

Jake Goidell argues that the ongoing NCAA lawsuit settlements will not create a lasting solution unless athletes form a players association that is involved in determining industry-wide decisions.

Diana Moss and Jason Gold write that the major private antitrust lawsuit involving how the National Collegiate Athletic Association governs compensation for college student athletes overreaches by remaking the model of college sports in the United States. Instead, the paradigm shift in college athletics should be deliberated and decided through the legislative process.

Eric A. Posner argues that merger review would benefit from involving union representatives to protect labor interests.

Gus Hurwitz replies to Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner’s May 8 article defending the Federal Trade Commission’s Congressional mandate to enforce a rule banning noncompetes. He argues that Congressional responses to FTC rulemaking in the 1970s suggest courts are unlikely to find that the FTC possesses such authority, either as a matter of statutory interpretation or under the major questions doctrine.

Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner argue that the Federal Trade Commissions’ recent ban on noncompete clauses is lawful under the plain language of the Federal Trade Commission Act, longstanding court precedent, and well-established administrative law principles.