antitrust and competition

Ariel Ezrachi warns about the rising trend of political instrumentalization of antitrust and competition enforcement and its consequences.

Diana L. Moss reviews the increasing politicization of antitrust and regulation in the United States and what avenues are available to resist the corruption of due process and usurpation of the rule of law.

Drawing on her working paper, Giovanna Massarotto discusses three algorithmic approaches to how Google can fairly and efficiently share its data with rivals per the requirements of a court’s mandated remedy for illegally monopolizing the online search market.

Judge Amit Mehta shaped his remedies in the Google Search case on the assumption that startups developing generative artificial intelligence models can restore competition in internet search. Mihir Kshirsagar analyzes the barriers to entry these startups face—scale, distribution, defaults, data and integration advantages, and content access—to show how Big Tech is still in control of the future of the search industry.

The policies of conservative antitrust laid out by the new antitrust enforcers suggest a continued focus on the welfare of consumers and workers. This suggests a continued role for economics in shaping and advancing antitrust policy. However, Aviv Nevo writes, it is not clear from the actual actions taken by the antitrust agencies that economics, rather than political considerations, will be guiding antitrust policy.

Gus Hurwitz explores the tenets of conservative antitrust under the second Trump administration and why it is unlikely to establish a lasting influence.

Thomas A. Lambert argues that the conservative antitrust program articulated by the antitrust enforcers of the Second Trump administration hardly resembles the conservative antitrust of previous decades. Its divergences will likely end up harming consumers.

Rebecca Haw Allensworth writes that the hallmark of the new conservative antitrust is not economic populism but silencing speech that the Trump administration ideologically opposes.

The European Commission has struggled to tackle excessive prices in Europe, despite evidence of how they arise in relation to market power. Aline Blankertz, Todd Davies, Justine Haekens, and Nicholas Shaxson argue that adopting accounting and financial analysis as part of its toolkit can enable the Commission to understand and act when firms are exploiting their market power.

Yunsieg P. Kim argues that economic regulation, including antitrust, can only be democratic if it is the choice of well-informed citizens. This article is part...