Erik Peinert explores the paradoxical relationship between economic concentration and democracy, where economic concentration compromises the democratic process and democratic backsliding also gains momentum by taking advantage of concentrated market actors, whose political power is now impotent, to capture civil society.
Recent years have witnessed a significant wave of initiatives aimed at expanding antitrust’s substantive reach and reinvigorating enforcement, both to counter decades of weakened enforcement and to address contemporary economic realities. These efforts have coincided with calls to “democratize” antitrust by engaging the public in policymaking. Barak Orbach argues that such “democratized antitrust” is impractical, but boundary-pushing dynamics are central to the evolution of antitrust. He offers a conceptual guide for antitrust boundary pushing.
Max von Thun and Claire Lavin argue that the European Commission must revise its merger guidelines to emphasize how competition policy can protect goals beyond prices, including innovation, security, and democracy. This will create a more prosperous European Union.
In new research, Tomaso Duso, Joseph Harrington, Carl Kreuzberg, and Geza Sapi demonstrate how their screening tool can aid antitrust authorities in identifying potential collusion between firms through public communications.
Luke Herrine evaluates the Federal Trade Commission’s transformation into a political tool to advance a conservative social agenda. He argues that no FTC initiative better exemplifies the agency’s politicization than its investigation into gender-affirming care that threatens transgender rights and autonomy.
In new research, Dominic Smith and Sergio Ocampo show that retail concentration has increased in most markets across the United States, with the expansion of large retail chains driving the trend toward a more concentrated retail landscape. Their findings are based on new product-level census data for all U.S. retailers. They explain the implications of this increased concentration for the everyday shopping experience of clothing, electronics, groceries, and much more.
The following is an adapted excerpt from “Monopoly Politics: Competition and Learning in the Evolution of Policy Regimes” by Erik Peinert, now out at Oxford University Press.
South Korea’s proposed Online Platform Regulation Act has taken multiple turns amid political upheaval, pressure from the United States, and a fiercely competitive domestic tech market. Hwang Lee explores how global geopolitics, strong domestic platforms, and the "Brussels Effect" are reshaping the country’s approach to digital regulation.