antitrust and competition

In new research, Saharsh Agarwal and Ananya Sen study how Google AI Overviews reduce traffic to content publishers, their impact on consumer experience, and the implications of these findings for platform regulation and copyright and competition law.

A remedy of “Pay for Half” that limits the share of devices for which Google can pay for default search status, as well as the share of revenue Google can pay its channel parters for that status, offers a middle ground that would help restore competition while preserving revenue for distribution partners, argue Alissa Cooper, Fiona Scott Morton, and Nick Jacobson.

Although merger review now acknowledges potential harms to labor markets, the analytical tools remain underdeveloped. Shishene Jing proposes identifying “labor market mavericks” as companies essential to maintaining competition among employers and preventing mergers that could reduce wages and other worker benefits.

Chilean authorities are testing an unofficial “independence rule” that forbids digital platforms from exerting further influence over how business users set their own prices through most-favored-nation clauses. Manuel Abarca Meza assesses how this rule could potentially fit into antitrust case law and whether or not it effectively weighs the risks against market efficiencies.

The federal Buy Clean initiative illustrates how procurement quotas can alter market structure by raising compliance costs and rewarding scale. As states expand their own Buy Clean programs, competition effects deserve the same scrutiny as environmental ones, writes Francesca Chiaradia.

Responding to Mark Lemley and Jacob Noti-Victor, Shishene Jing argues that licensing deals struck by incumbent artificial intelligence firms with content owners will not disadvantage smaller AI rivals. Even if such deals establish a legal precedent requiring licenses, content owners have little incentive to actually sue small, cash-poor AI startups, making the precedent toothless in practice.

In a new paper, Joseph Emmens, Dennis C. Hutschenreiter, Stefano Manfredonia, Felix Noth, and Tommaso Santini find that when competitors for the same pool of workers share investors, they increase their innovation to automate tasks and slow down hiring.    

Supporters of more robust antitrust policy have pointed to the subsequent success of Figma after authorities blocked Adobe’s acquisition of it. Skeptics, including venture capitalists, have argued that the one case reveals nothing systematic about the benefits of stronger merger review. Venture capitalists happen to be the one party with the data and resources to fund the studies to show any systematic correlation one way or the other. They should do so, writes Shishene Jing.

The revived American Innovation Choice Online Act singles out a handful of Big Tech giants for unique, antitrust-like restrictions, but without the standard methodological...

In new research, Semih Üslü and Flavien Moreau argue that waves of mergers and acquisition, which are typically unstable and ultimately crash, are not driven by changes in economic conditions, but by self-reinforcing appetite for mergers among firms when others are also engaging in M&A. Policies that drive stable, low-merger conditions can lead to better outcomes for consumers.