Research

Did the Meme Stock Revolution Actually Change Anything?

Many financial commentators thought that the surge of retail investors participating in the stock market, the most notable of whom boosted “meme stocks” like GameStop, would democratize corporate governance and improve prosocial firm behavior, including the promotion of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) goals. In new research, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, and Yoon-Ho Alex Lee find evidence that the exact opposite took place.

Innovators Respond to Their Presidential Candidate Winning With More Innovation

Does an inventor’s political identity influence their productivity? In a new paper, Joseph Engelberg, Runjing Lu, William Mullins, and Richard Townsend examine the impacts of the 2008 and 2016 United States presidential elections on Democrat and Republican inventors, with a particular focus on the quantity and quality of patents after the country elects a new president.

How Well Consumers Know Prices Matters for Tax Policy

The effectiveness of tax policy depends on whether sellers pass on changes in tax rates to consumers through changes in price. In new research, Felix Montag, Robin Mamrak, Alina Sagimuldina, and Monika Schnitzer investigate how this tax pass-through in turn depends on how much consumers know about prices. They show that if consumers are not aware of how prices for the same product vary between sellers, then they will be unaffected by tax changes intended to increase or decrease consumption.

Is Social Science Research Politically Biased?

In new research, Matthew C. Ringgenberg, Chong Shu, and Ingrid M. Werner ask if academic research exhibits political slants. They develop a new measure of the political slant of research and study how it varies by discipline, demographics, and the political party of the sitting United States president. Finally, they show that their measure is related to the researchers' personal political ideology, suggestive of an ideological echo chamber in social science research.

Market Competition Hurts Firm’s ESG Performance

New research by Vesa Pursiainen, Hanwen Sun and Yue Xiang finds that competition hurts corporate incentives to fulfill environmental, social, and governance (ESG) goals. Firms facing more competitive pressure have worse ESG scores, in particular when the firms have short-term-oriented shareholders. However, firms located in areas that are more concerned about climate change appear more willing to sacrifice profits for better ESG performance.

How China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign Impacted Firm Performance

William Megginson, Kedi Wang, and Junjie Xia find in new research that the Chinese Communist Party’s anti-corruption campaign produced worse firm performance by reducing managers’ risk tolerance.

The EU’s AI Act Shows How To Regulate AI. It Could Be Improved

In light of the rise of generative artificial intelligence (AI) and recent debates about the socio-political implications of large-language models and chatbots, Manuel Wörsdörfer analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA), the world’s first comprehensive attempt by a government body to address and mitigate the potential negative impacts of AI technologies. He recommends areas where the AIA could be improved.

Closing the Revolving Door Comes With Trade-offs

How prolific is the revolving door issue at the federal level? In a new paper, Joseph Kalmenovitz, Siddharth Vij, and Kairong Xiao analyze the prevalence of revolving door behavior in the United States government and discuss the impacts of limiting private sector job prospects for regulators.

CEOs Have Real Incentives To Promote ESG

In new research, Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis, and David Webber create a framework explaining why CEOs have powerful incentives to promote ESG, why these incentives are distinct from those of shareholders, why they are powerful despite the lack of governance mechanisms, and why they are at times excessive or skewed.

Reducing Corporate Fines Often Penalizes Rather Than Protects the Public

Government regulators may reduce corporate fines for criminal behavior if the fines threaten the firm’s survival, thus posing harms to employees and society. In a recent paper, Nathan Atkinson explores the frequency with which government regulators reduce fines and evaluates if these reductions are justified or if regulators are undermining their own capabilities to deter bad behavior and fully compensate harmed parties.

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