Regulatory Capture

George Stigler Was Wrong About the SEC, But Asked the Right Questions

Joel Seligman's article examines the historical debate surrounding the Securities and Exchange Commission's mandatory corporate disclosure system, focusing on George Stigler's influential 1964 critique and subsequent discussions. While acknowledging Stigler's role in sparking important questions about regulatory necessity, Seligman argues that critics often underestimated the historical evidence of securities fraud and the need for public market confidence, ultimately defending the continued relevance of mandated disclosure in securities regulation.

Determination Committees Deciding on Credit Event Decisions Should Bolster Independence

Randy Priem reviews the current discussions about fortifying the independence of determination committees deciding whether a credit event took place for single-name credit default swaps. He offers several possible strategies.

Food for Thought

An excerpt from the second edition of Marion Nestle's book, Food Politics: How the Food Industry Influences Nutrition and Health, out now.

Rent-Seeking Alone Does Not Explain Why Wealthy Families Run for Office

From the Kennedy family to Chile's Matte family, powerful and wealthy families often seek political office. New research by Patricio Duran, Marcelo Ortiz, and Michael Carney seek to understand what those politically active families have in common and discuss potential motivations.

Closing the Revolving Door Comes With Trade-offs

How prolific is the revolving door issue at the federal level? In a new paper, Joseph Kalmenovitz, Siddharth Vij, and Kairong Xiao analyze the prevalence of revolving door behavior in the United States government and discuss the impacts of limiting private sector job prospects for regulators.

The Market for Markets Is Captured

George Stigler posited that economic regulation is best understood as a product created via a market process. In the market for regulation, different participants—such as politicians, firms, and voters—buy and sell the rules of the game to serve their individual interests. In new research, Jac Heckelman and Bonnie Wilson use Stigler’s theory of economic regulation and special interest capture to study why foreign aid to developing countries that is tied to market reform has not successfully accomplished its goals.

Holding Up the News

Meta has silenced news organizations’ social media accounts in response to Canada’s Online News Act, a law not yet in effect. Josh Braun describes the reasoning behind such legislation, its potential flaws, and how Meta, particularly Facebook, has turned the Canadian wildfire crisis into a regulatory pressure campaign.

Family Ties as Corporate Power

Pablo Balán explains that family ties provide firms with an edge in collective action that enables them to be politically active through campaign donations, to engage in financial rent-seeking by obtaining subsidized state credit, and to bypass regulation seeking to curtail the influence of business by substituting individual contributions for corporate contributions. Scholars and advocates can benefit from a deeper understanding of organizational constraints to programmatic reform.

Australian PwC Scandal Reeks of Regulatory Capture

Accounting firm Price Waterhouse Cooper was recently forced to sell its government consulting business after using privileged information to help firms evade taxes. Richard Holden examines the scandal and explains why the response from the Australian Tax Office points to regulatory capture by the big 4 accounting firms.

How Big Tech Uses Net Neutrality To Subvert Competition

A decade of evidence suggests that Open Internet policies have delivered the opposite effect.

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