Itzhak Ben-David
Professor Itzhak (“Zahi”) Ben-David is the Neil Klatskin Chair in Finance and Real Estate at The Ohio State University Fisher College of Business. He serves as the Academic Director of the Ohio State University Center for Real Estate. He teaches real estate and finance. Ben-David works in several research areas in finance including real estate, financial intermediation, financial markets, behavioral finance, and household finance. Professor Ben-David holds a PhD in Finance and an MBA from the University of Chicago, as well as a BS and an MS in Industrial Engineering, a BA in Accounting from Tel-Aviv University, and an MS in Finance from London Business School.
Regulation
FinTech Lending with LowTech Pricing
New research indicates that FinTech lending has not been as ‘disruptive’ in risk-based pricing as claimed. While FinTech has provided increased loan access to some individuals, reliance on traditional credit scoring and spillovers from banking regulations leads to mispricing and cross-subsidization of borrowers. The authors suggest alternatives to allocate capital efficiently and improve financial inclusion.
ESG, Corporate Governance & Future of the Firm
How Hedge Fund Performance Fees Fail Investors
In the hedge fund industry, there is a material disconnect between funds’ lifetime performance and lifetime incentive fees for managers. A new...
ESG, Corporate Governance & Future of the Firm
Richard Thaler and the Science of People
Richard Thaler's thought process and perspective on human behavior have influenced how we view economic phenomena and how they affect and are effected by people.
Earlier...
Latest news
Antitrust and Competition
Merged Firms Offer Less Product Variety
In new research, Enghin Atalay, Alan Sorensen, Christopher Sullivan, and Wanjia Zhu find that mergers and acquisitions often lead to the merged firm offering less product variety than when the two firms operated pre-merger.
Antitrust and Competition
Revising Guideline 6 With Evidence To Establish a Structural Inference for Input Foreclosure
Vertical merger law lacks the structural presumption of horizontal merger law, which shifts the burden from the government to the merging parties to provide evidence that a merger will not produce anticompetitive effects when it is known that the merger will substantially increase market concentration. To improve Guideline 6 of the draft Merger Guidelines concerning vertical foreclosure, Steven Salop develops a three-factor criteria with which the government antitrust agencies can show an analogous structural “inference” that shifts the burden of evidence to the merging parties.
Antitrust and Competition
How US Antitrust Enforcement Against Xerox Promoted Innovation by Japanese Competitors
Xerox invented modern copier technology and was so successful that its brand name became a verb. In 1972, U.S. antitrust authorities charged Xerox with monopolization and eventually ordered the licensing of all its copier-related patents. As new research by Robin Mamrak shows, this antitrust intervention promoted subsequent innovation in the copier industry, but only among Japanese competitors. Nevertheless, their innovations benefited U.S. consumers.
Antitrust and Competition
Revising the Merger Guidelines To Return Antitrust to a Sound Economic and Legal Foundation
The draft Merger Guidelines largely replace the consumer welfare standard of the Chicago School with the lessening of competition principle found in the 1914 Clayton Act. This shift would enable the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice Antitrust Division to utilize the full extent of modern economics to respond to rising concentration and its harmful effects, writes John Kwoka.
Economic History
How Anthony Downs’s Analysis Explains Rational Voters’ Preferences for Populism
In new research, Cyril Hédoin and Alexandre Chirat use the rational-choice theory of economist Anthony Downs to explain how populism rationally arises to challenge established institutions of liberal democracy.
Antitrust and Competition
The Impact of Large Institutional Investors on Innovation Is Not as Positive as One Might Expect
In a new paper, Bing Guo, Dennis C. Hutschenreiter, David Pérez-Castrillo, and Anna Toldrà-Simats study how large institutional investors impact firm innovation. The authors find that large institutional investors encourage internal research and development but discourage firm acquisitions that would add patents and knowledge to their firms’ portfolios, hampering overall innovation.
Antitrust and Competition
The FTC Needs To Focus Arguments on Technological Transitions After High-Profile Losses
Joshua Gray and Cristian Santesteban argue that the Federal Trade Commission's focus in Meta-Within and Microsoft-Activision on narrow markets like VR fitness apps and consoles missed the boat on the real competition issue: the threat to future competition in nascent markets like VR platforms and cloud gaming.
