Anil Kashyap

Anil Kashyap is the Stevens Distinguished Service Professor of Economics and Finance at the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business. His research focuses on financial intermediation and regulation, the Japanese economy, macroeconomics and monetary policy. He co-founded the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum (the leading private sector conference on US Monetary policy) and is a research associate for the National Bureau of Economic Research, and a research fellow for the Centre for Economic Policy Research. He is a co-director of the Chicago Booth Initiative on Global Markets. He has advised numerous government and international organizations, including the Cabinet Office of the Japanese Prime Minister, the European Central Bank, the Swedish Riksbank, the International Monetary Fund, the United States Congressional Budget Office and the Federal Reserve Banks of Chicago and New York. He has testified before the U.S. Congress and the U.K. Parliament. From 2016 to 2022, he was an external member of the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee. He has taught courses on Corporation Finance, Advanced Macroeconomics, Understanding Central Banks and Analyzing Financial Crises. He won the Emory Williams Award for Teaching Excellence at Chicago Booth in 2014. Among the various awards he has received is the “The Order of the Rising Sun, Gold Rays with Neck Ribbon” from the Emperor of Japan and a Sloan Research Fellowship in Economics. He received his Bachelor’s degree from the University of California at Davis and his PhD in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

How Do We Avoid the Next SVB?

Anil Kashyap explains why the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank are the result of the failure of the Dodd-Frank...

Explaining the Rationale for the 2022 Nobel Prize in Economics

Anil Kashyap explains the research of Douglas Diamond, who won the 2022 Nobel Prize in Economics. This post originally appeared on Chicago...

Latest news

The Whig History of the Merger Guidelines

A pervasive "Whig" view of United States antitrust history among scholars and practitioners celebrates the Merger Guidelines' implementation of increasingly sophisticated economic methods since their...

Algorithmic Collusion in the Housing Market

While the development of artificial intelligence has led to efficient business strategies, such as dynamic pricing, this new technology is vulnerable to collusion and consumer harm when companies share the same software through a central platform. Gabriele Bortolotti highlights the importance of antitrust enforcement in this domain for the second article in our series, using as a case study the RealPage class action lawsuit in the Seattle housing market.

The Future Markets Model Explains Meta/Within: A Reply to Herb Hovenkamp

In response to both Herb Hovenkamp’s February 27 article in ProMarket and, perhaps more importantly, also to Hovenkamp’s highly regarded treatise, Lawrence B. Landman, first, shows that the Future Markets Model explains the court’s decision in Meta/Within. Since Meta was not even trying to make a future product, the court correctly found that Meta would not enter the Future Market. Second, the Future Markets Model is the analytical tool which Hovenkamp says the enforcers lack when they try to protect competition to innovate.

The Chicago Boys and the Chilean Neoliberal Project

In a new book, The Chile Project: The Story of the Chicago Boys and the Downfall of Neoliberalism, Sebastian Edwards details the history of neoliberalism in Chile over the past seventy years. The Chicago Boys—a group of Chilean economists trained at the University of Chicago through the U.S. State Department’s “Chile Project”—played a central role in neoliberalism’s ascent during General Augusto Pinochet’s rule. What follows is an excerpt from the book on University of Chicago economist Milton Friedman’s 1975 visit to Chile to meet with Pinochet and business leaders.

Creating a Modern Antitrust Welfare Standard that Integrates Post-Chicago and Neo-Brandeisian Goals

Darren Bush, Mark Glick, and Gabriel A. Lozada argue that the Consumer Welfare Standard  is inconsistent with modern welfare economics and that a modern approach to antitrust could integrate traditional Congressional goals as advocated by the Neo-Brandesians. Such an approach could be the basis for an alliance between the post-Chicago economists and the Neo-Brandesians.

Getting Partisans To Listen to One Another Can Reduce Political Polarization

In new research, Guglielmo Briscese and Michèle Belot find that reminding Americans of shared values can open lines of communication and help reduce political polarization.

The State of The Debate on U.S. Antitrust and Competition

This year’s Stigler Center conference on antitrust and competition invited scholars to propose alternatives to the consumer welfare standard.