Anil Kashyap

Anil Kashyap is the Stevens Distinguished Service Professor of Economics and Finance at the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business. His research focuses on financial intermediation and regulation, the Japanese economy, macroeconomics and monetary policy. He co-founded the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum (the leading private sector conference on US Monetary policy) and is a research associate for the National Bureau of Economic Research, and a research fellow for the Centre for Economic Policy Research. He is a co-director of the Chicago Booth Initiative on Global Markets. He has advised numerous government and international organizations, including the Cabinet Office of the Japanese Prime Minister, the European Central Bank, the Swedish Riksbank, the International Monetary Fund, the United States Congressional Budget Office and the Federal Reserve Banks of Chicago and New York. He has testified before the U.S. Congress and the U.K. Parliament. From 2016 to 2022, he was an external member of the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee. He has taught courses on Corporation Finance, Advanced Macroeconomics, Understanding Central Banks and Analyzing Financial Crises. He won the Emory Williams Award for Teaching Excellence at Chicago Booth in 2014. Among the various awards he has received is the “The Order of the Rising Sun, Gold Rays with Neck Ribbon” from the Emperor of Japan and a Sloan Research Fellowship in Economics. He received his Bachelor’s degree from the University of California at Davis and his PhD in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

How Do We Avoid the Next SVB?

Anil Kashyap explains why the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank are the result of the failure of the Dodd-Frank...

Explaining the Rationale for the 2022 Nobel Prize in Economics

Anil Kashyap explains the research of Douglas Diamond, who won the 2022 Nobel Prize in Economics. This post originally appeared on Chicago...

Latest news

Do Wealth Taxes Significantly Curb Wealth Inequality?

Politicians and governments in the United States and elsewhere have recently proposed or implemented wealth taxes to supplement revenue and reduce wealth inequality. In a new study, Samira Marti, Isabel Z. Martínez, and Florian Scheuer show how decreases in wealth taxes led to increases in wealth inequality in Switzerland, though they find that these decreases alone are not enough to explain the magnitude of widening disparities.

Merged Firms Offer Less Product Variety

In new research, Enghin Atalay, Alan Sorensen, Christopher Sullivan, and Wanjia Zhu find that mergers and acquisitions often lead to the merged firm offering less product variety than when the two firms operated pre-merger.

Revising Guideline 6 With Evidence To Establish a Structural Inference for Input Foreclosure

Vertical merger law lacks the structural presumption of horizontal merger law, which shifts the burden from the government to the merging parties to provide evidence that a merger will not produce anticompetitive effects when it is known that the merger will substantially increase market concentration. To improve Guideline 6 of the draft Merger Guidelines concerning vertical foreclosure, Steven Salop develops a three-factor criteria with which the government antitrust agencies can show an analogous structural “inference” that shifts the burden of evidence to the merging parties.

How US Antitrust Enforcement Against Xerox Promoted Innovation by Japanese Competitors

Xerox invented modern copier technology and was so successful that its brand name became a verb. In 1972, U.S. antitrust authorities charged Xerox with monopolization and eventually ordered the licensing of all its copier-related patents. As new research by Robin Mamrak shows, this antitrust intervention promoted subsequent innovation in the copier industry, but only among Japanese competitors. Nevertheless, their innovations benefited U.S. consumers.

Revising the Merger Guidelines To Return Antitrust to a Sound Economic and Legal Foundation

The draft Merger Guidelines largely replace the consumer welfare standard of the Chicago School with the lessening of competition principle found in the 1914 Clayton Act. This shift would enable the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice Antitrust Division to utilize the full extent of modern economics to respond to rising concentration and its harmful effects, writes John Kwoka.

How Anthony Downs’s Analysis Explains Rational Voters’ Preferences for Populism

In new research, Cyril Hédoin and Alexandre Chirat use the rational-choice theory of economist Anthony Downs to explain how populism rationally arises to challenge established institutions of liberal democracy.

The Impact of Large Institutional Investors on Innovation Is Not as Positive as One Might Expect

In a new paper, Bing Guo, Dennis C. Hutschenreiter, David Pérez-Castrillo, and Anna Toldrà-Simats study how large institutional investors impact firm innovation. The authors find that large institutional investors encourage internal research and development but discourage firm acquisitions that would add patents and knowledge to their firms’ portfolios, hampering overall innovation.