FTC

Illumina/Grail: Using the Future Markets Model To Ask the Right Question

Grail and its competitors are developing tests which will save perhaps millions of lives. They will detect many different types of cancer very early—if they ever exist. All these tests need Illumina’s instruments. The FTC, reversing an administrative law judge, said Illumina could not buy Grail. If it did, the FTC said, it would not let Grail’s competitors use its instruments. Illumina has appealed, saying, among other things, that since the tests do not exist there is, for antitrust purposes, currently no market.  Yet while the tests may or may not exist in the future the Fifth Circuit has to decide this case now.

The Convoluted Regulatory Regime for M&A Assessments in the US

What happens when the goals of antitrust enforcers clash with regulators focused on issues of national security and public interest? A forthcoming book by Ioannis Kokkoris, Public Interest Considerations in US Merger Control, explores these tensions in the United States regulatory framework.

How To Handle Big Tech Acquisitions Under Uncertainty

The Federal Trade Commission recently failed to stop Meta’s acquisition of virtual reality company Within, while the Department of Justice is now...

The FTC’s Non-Compete Ban Will Force Questions Over the Scope of its Authority

To understand why a proposed rule could spark a Supreme Court battle over the Federal Trade Commission’s powers to regulate the American...

Unfair Methods of Competition

The FTC’s new policy on unfair methods of competition is an assertion of the original purpose of the agency, allowing it to...

The FTC Should Quickly Issue New Section 5 Enforcement Guidelines

Unfair methods of competition are prohibited by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act. The FTC has withdrawn the existing...

Larry Summers Cautions Antitrust Regulators Against Broad-Brush Policy

In a wide-ranging interview with ProMarket, Summers expands on recent criticism of top antitrust enforcement officials, efforts to stymie Big Tech, monopsony,...

Q&A With FTC Chair Lina Khan: “The Word ‘Efficiency’ Doesn’t Appear Anywhere in the Antitrust Statutes”

FTC Chair Lina Khan sat down with Guy Rolnik to discuss changes in governmental posture toward antitrust enforcement, her goals as head...

A Posner-Stigler Smoking Gun?

A memo from George Stigler and Richard Posner to the Reagan administration was recently unearthed. To understand the meaning behind the memo,...

Populism at the FTC Upsets the Antitrust Religion of Consumer Welfare: A Reply to Sokol and Wickelgren

Institutional change, on any fundamental level, will have those that seek to defend the status quo up in arms. But in order...

LATEST NEWS

Merged Firms Offer Less Product Variety

In new research, Enghin Atalay, Alan Sorensen, Christopher Sullivan, and Wanjia Zhu find that mergers and acquisitions often lead to the merged firm offering less product variety than when the two firms operated pre-merger.

Revising Guideline 6 With Evidence To Establish a Structural Inference for Input Foreclosure

Vertical merger law lacks the structural presumption of horizontal merger law, which shifts the burden from the government to the merging parties to provide evidence that a merger will not produce anticompetitive effects when it is known that the merger will substantially increase market concentration. To improve Guideline 6 of the draft Merger Guidelines concerning vertical foreclosure, Steven Salop develops a three-factor criteria with which the government antitrust agencies can show an analogous structural “inference” that shifts the burden of evidence to the merging parties.

How US Antitrust Enforcement Against Xerox Promoted Innovation by Japanese Competitors

Xerox invented modern copier technology and was so successful that its brand name became a verb. In 1972, U.S. antitrust authorities charged Xerox with monopolization and eventually ordered the licensing of all its copier-related patents. As new research by Robin Mamrak shows, this antitrust intervention promoted subsequent innovation in the copier industry, but only among Japanese competitors. Nevertheless, their innovations benefited U.S. consumers.

Revising the Merger Guidelines To Return Antitrust to a Sound Economic and Legal Foundation

The draft Merger Guidelines largely replace the consumer welfare standard of the Chicago School with the lessening of competition principle found in the 1914 Clayton Act. This shift would enable the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice Antitrust Division to utilize the full extent of modern economics to respond to rising concentration and its harmful effects, writes John Kwoka.

How Anthony Downs’s Analysis Explains Rational Voters’ Preferences for Populism

In new research, Cyril Hédoin and Alexandre Chirat use the rational-choice theory of economist Anthony Downs to explain how populism rationally arises to challenge established institutions of liberal democracy.