In new research, Martin Schmalz and Jin Xie examine how shareholder preferences influence the United States pharmaceutical industry. They find that generic-drug manufacturers sometimes harm their firms’ own value when doing so benefits shareholder portfolios, who frequently have stakes in competing brand-name firms.

Hannah Pittock uses weight-loss company Novo Nordisk’s offer to acquire Metsera to create a three-prong framework by which the antitrust agencies can identify when an invitation to exclude a rival from a market constitutes illegal exclusionary conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

Steve Salop explores the anticompetitive innovation behind weight-loss giant Novo Nordisk’s offer to acquire Metsera. Novo’s proposed contract presents a new tactic by which firms with market power can preclude rival mergers that will lead to procompetitive entry.

President Donald Trump has, across two administrations, sought to lower drug prices for Americans, most recently with executive order “Delivering Most-Favored-Nation Prescription Drug Pricing to American Patients.” Margherita Colangelo explains why his order is unlikely to accomplish its goal.

Recent border carbon measures have relied on the theory that stricter environmental rules in rich countries push pollution-intensive production toward developing economies with weaker regulations. In new research, Irfan Saleem and Giray Gozgor show that the “pollution haven” mechanism is neither automatic nor uniform across industries. Evidence is mixed, often small in magnitude, and highly sensitive to how we measure regulation, model trade, and account for industry mobility.

The European Union can pursue financial sovereignty through the digital euro, but sovereignty over money doesn't mean sovereignty over the markets that form around it, writes Jeff Alvares.

If confirmed, Kevin Warsh would be the latest Federal Reserve chair whose career took place primarily on Wall Street rather than in academia. The ascent of Wall Street veterans in the Fed risks skewing monetary policy to favor large investors and the wealthiest, writes Franny Philos Sophia.

In new research, Michele Fioretti, Victor Saint-Jean, and Simon Smith show that NGO activism follows a clear economic logic: when NGOs lack visibility, stakeholders do not view them as credible, forcing them to rely on high-profile campaigns during annual shareholder meetings. However, these actions generate attention but rarely influence decisions. As NGOs gain recognition, they can campaign earlier, when votes are still open, and meaningfully sway shareholders and change corporate behavior.