Hannah Pittock uses weight-loss company Novo Nordisk’s offer to acquire Metsera to create a three-prong framework by which the antitrust agencies can identify when an invitation to exclude a rival from a market constitutes illegal exclusionary conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

Steve Salop explores the anticompetitive innovation behind weight-loss giant Novo Nordisk’s offer to acquire Metsera. Novo’s proposed contract presents a new tactic by which firms with market power can preclude rival mergers that will lead to procompetitive entry.

President Donald Trump has, across two administrations, sought to lower drug prices for Americans, most recently with executive order “Delivering Most-Favored-Nation Prescription Drug Pricing to American Patients.” Margherita Colangelo explains why his order is unlikely to accomplish its goal.

In new research, Benjamin Wood, Sven Gallasch, Nicholas Shaxson, Katherine Sievert, and Gary Sacks write that competition underenforcement and a narrow regulatory focus on prices and output has allowed industries that produce harmful consumer products, such as tobacco or ultra-processed foods, to increase demand and, consequentially, harm to society. They argue that competition law must evolve to consider health impacts.

In the second of two articles, Jeff Alvares analyzes the competing arguments around Pix under World Trade Organization rules—a debate involving broader questions about how international trade rules need to reflect the complexity of public services in the digital economy.

In the first of two articles, Jeff Alvares explores how Brazil’s public digital payments system achieved transformative financial inclusion through vertically integrated infrastructure, creating a model now facing scrutiny under international trade law and raising questions about the boundaries of legitimate public infrastructure provision.

In new research, Norman Bishara and Lorenzo Luisetto analyze the nature and proliferation of state legislative activity to regulate noncompete agreements since 2009. In the absence of a federal rule, these developments represent a promising step toward curbing the abuse of noncompete agreements.

In new research, Yusheng Feng, Haishi Li, Siwei Wang, and Min Zhu show that higher industrial subsidies raise the likelihood and severity of foreign antidumping and countervailing duties. These retaliatory duties wipe out roughly a quarter of the revenue growth the subsidies would otherwise create for firms. Failing to address the potential consequences of subsidies may lead governments to overstate the net benefits of industrial policy and fuel deeper trade frictions.