In a forthcoming paper in the Yale Journal on Regulation, Stefan Bechtold, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Edoardo Martino, and Gideon Parchomovsky examine how smart contracts are transforming financial contracting by creating enforceable rights that bind third parties without the legal formalities property law has always required. This “property without law” phenomenon enhances financial efficiency while exposing the public to systemic risks beyond the reach of existing regulation.

In new research, Alexander Furnas, Timothy LaPira, and Clare Brock find that most politically active organizations engage in either campaign contributions or lobbying, but rarely both.The findings have implications for regulation and future academic research.

Meta prevailed in its monopoly case against the Federal Trade Commission by showing that the FTC’s market definition of personal social media was too narrow. However, Meta’s argument—and Judge James Boasberg’s ruling—rested on a flawed empirical assumption that confuses how users divert their time to other activities when no longer able to use a Meta platform with true product substitution.

In a new volume chapter, Shai Agmon and Samuel Bagg argue that academic and policy references to “competition” often fail to distinguish between competition’s many forms. Their disaggregation of competition into two complementary processes—parallel and friction competition—helps to clarify the neo-Brandeisian approach to competition policy and its advantages over the traditional consumer welfare approach.

In new research, Alejandro Herrera-Caicedo, Jessica Jeffers, and Elena Prager find that firms that share a C-suite executive or board director are much more...