The House v. NCAA private antitrust settlement professionalized collegiate sports by requiring colleges and universities to compensate student athletes. The case has changed the economics of college sports, pushing schools to spend big to pay for top athletes to field teams that compete for championships. New research from the Progressive Policy Institute finds that although the new model has narrowed success to the top programs, the ability for schools to pay for success has now been mostly priced in, writes Diana L. Moss.
In new research exploiting state-level changes in non-compete enforceability, Kate Reinmuth and Emma Rockall find that stronger non-competes have historically reduced innovation in the United States. These declines are driven by sharp drops in inventor mobility and knowledge spillovers, especially in young, high-growth sectors.
Matt Lucky reviews Dani Rodrik’s new book, “Shared Prosperity in a Fractured World: A New Economics for the Middle Class, the Global Poor, and Our Climate”
In new research, Mario Amore, Morten Bennedsen, Birthe Larsen, and Zeyu Zhao examine the symbiotic relationship between working environments and employee well-being, finding that when workers are safe and satisfied, companies profit.
Summary Teaser: In a new working paper, Jakob Beuschlein, Jósef Sigurdsson, and Horng Chern Wong find that workers at acquired firms in Sweden experience wage cuts. Rather than from the increased monopsony power of employers, these wage cuts are due to rent redistribution toward higher CEO pay.
In new research, Norman Bishara and Lorenzo Luisetto analyze the nature and proliferation of state legislative activity to regulate noncompete agreements since 2009. In the absence of a federal rule, these developments represent a promising step toward curbing the abuse of noncompete agreements.
In new research, Priyaranjan Jha, Jyotsana Kala, David Neumark, and Antonio Rodriguez-Lopez find that studies arguing higher minimum wages have no employment effect—or even a positive effect—in many labor markets fail to account for how much less minimum wages matter in larger, higher-wage cities.
In new research, Axel Gottfries and Gregor Jarosch develop a model to understand how wage-fixing cartels operate and show how to gauge the harm they cause to workers.