Yuriy Gorodnichenko is Quantedge Presidential Professor at the Department of Economics, University of California - Berkeley. He received his B.A. and MA at EERC/Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (Kyiv, Ukraine) and his Ph.D. at the University of Michigan. He is broadly interested in macroeconomics and issues related to transition economies (especially, labour markets and firm performance). Yuriy serves on many editorial boards, including Journal of Monetary Economics and VoxUkraine. He is also affiliated with NBER and IZA.
Using a household survey with information treatments conducted in the aftermath of the SVB’s collapse, we examine the potential for a large bank’s failure to trigger bank runs and the effectiveness of public communication in containing such a risk. We find that news about SVB’s collapse increases households’ propensity to withdraw bank deposits as people become more worried that their bank may fail and expect larger losses on deposits in case of bank failure. Communication by the Federal Reserve in support of the banking sector and information about FDIC deposit insurance can contain the risk of bank runs, while communication from politicians influences only their electoral base.
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