Tim Greaney
Thomas (Tim) Greaney, JD, is a Visiting Professor of Law at UC Hastings College of Law in San Francisco and Distinguished Senior Fellow with the UC Hastings/UCSF Consortium on Law, Science & Health Policy. He is also Chester A. Myers Emeritus Professor of Law at Saint Louis University School of Law where he served as Director of the Center for Health Law Studies. His research focuses on the application of antitrust law to the health care sector, health care financing, and health care law and policy. He has written over 60 scholarly articles and chapters and is co-author of the nation’s leading health law casebook, HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (West, 8th edition 2018) and a treatise on health law, HEALTH LAW (WEST 3RD ED. 2014). He has testified on health care competition issues before the Judiciary Committees of the United States Senate and House of Representatives, the California Department of Insurance, and has spoken at workshops of the Federal Trade Commission. He has commented on health policy and law issues in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal and many other publications. Before entering academia, he served as an Assistant Chief in the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, supervising health care antitrust litigation. Professor Greaney has been named Health Law Professor of the Year by the American Society of Law and Medicine and has been a Fulbright Fellow studying European Community competition law in Brussels, Belgium. He received his B.A. from Wesleyan University and his J.D. from Harvard Law School.
Antitrust and Competition
Invigorating Competition in Health Care Markets: Is Rate Regulation Needed?
It now appears that market concentration may be the leading cause of America’s health care cost crisis. If the United States is...
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Fiscal Policy
Do Wealth Taxes Significantly Curb Wealth Inequality?
Politicians and governments in the United States and elsewhere have recently proposed or implemented wealth taxes to supplement revenue and reduce wealth inequality. In a new study, Samira Marti, Isabel Z. Martínez, and Florian Scheuer show how decreases in wealth taxes led to increases in wealth inequality in Switzerland, though they find that these decreases alone are not enough to explain the magnitude of widening disparities.
Antitrust and Competition
Merged Firms Offer Less Product Variety
In new research, Enghin Atalay, Alan Sorensen, Christopher Sullivan, and Wanjia Zhu find that mergers and acquisitions often lead to the merged firm offering less product variety than when the two firms operated pre-merger.
Antitrust and Competition
Revising Guideline 6 With Evidence To Establish a Structural Inference for Input Foreclosure
Vertical merger law lacks the structural presumption of horizontal merger law, which shifts the burden from the government to the merging parties to provide evidence that a merger will not produce anticompetitive effects when it is known that the merger will substantially increase market concentration. To improve Guideline 6 of the draft Merger Guidelines concerning vertical foreclosure, Steven Salop develops a three-factor criteria with which the government antitrust agencies can show an analogous structural “inference” that shifts the burden of evidence to the merging parties.
Antitrust and Competition
How US Antitrust Enforcement Against Xerox Promoted Innovation by Japanese Competitors
Xerox invented modern copier technology and was so successful that its brand name became a verb. In 1972, U.S. antitrust authorities charged Xerox with monopolization and eventually ordered the licensing of all its copier-related patents. As new research by Robin Mamrak shows, this antitrust intervention promoted subsequent innovation in the copier industry, but only among Japanese competitors. Nevertheless, their innovations benefited U.S. consumers.
Antitrust and Competition
Revising the Merger Guidelines To Return Antitrust to a Sound Economic and Legal Foundation
The draft Merger Guidelines largely replace the consumer welfare standard of the Chicago School with the lessening of competition principle found in the 1914 Clayton Act. This shift would enable the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice Antitrust Division to utilize the full extent of modern economics to respond to rising concentration and its harmful effects, writes John Kwoka.
Economic History
How Anthony Downs’s Analysis Explains Rational Voters’ Preferences for Populism
In new research, Cyril Hédoin and Alexandre Chirat use the rational-choice theory of economist Anthony Downs to explain how populism rationally arises to challenge established institutions of liberal democracy.
Antitrust and Competition
The Impact of Large Institutional Investors on Innovation Is Not as Positive as One Might Expect
In a new paper, Bing Guo, Dennis C. Hutschenreiter, David Pérez-Castrillo, and Anna Toldrà-Simats study how large institutional investors impact firm innovation. The authors find that large institutional investors encourage internal research and development but discourage firm acquisitions that would add patents and knowledge to their firms’ portfolios, hampering overall innovation.
