Jan Pieter Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen is the Scientific Director of the Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, and a Professor of Finance at Goethe University’s House of Finance. His current research focuses on the design of regulation and supervisory institutions for banks and capital markets. Ongoing work covers impact assessment of regulatory interventions, the role of market discipline in banking and market integrity in capital markets, moral hazard in credit securitization, green finance, and the role of public backstop schemes. His publications appeared, among others, in the Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Journal of Financial Stability, and Experimental Economics. Jan Krahnen is a CEPR research fellow, and was President of the European Finance Association in 2011. Krahnen has been involved in policy advisory work relating to financial market regulation, as a member of the High Level Expert Group on Structural Reforms of the EU Banking Sector (“Liikanen Commission”) in 2012, and as a member of the Issing-Commission, advising the German government on the G-20 meetings from 2008-2012. He was also a member of the Group of Economic Advisors (GEA) at the European Securities and Markets Agency (ESMA), Paris, and currently serves as a member of the Academic Advisory Board of Germany’s Federal Ministry of Finance.
ESG & Corporate Governance
Wirecard Scandal: When All Lines of Defense Against Corporate Fraud Fail
Scandals such as Wirecard can destroy investor trust in capital markets working fairly and with integrity. A new policy brief commissioned by...
Latest news
Commentary
The Banking Risks of Central Bank Digital Currencies
The implementation of central bank digital currencies as the primary medium of exchange would exacerbate the flaws of our current fiat system which encourage banks to overextend credit and create liabilities that they cannot redeem. This will worsen the already recurring cycles of financial crises, writes Vibhu Vikramaditya.
Antitrust and Competition
The Whig History of the Merger Guidelines
A pervasive "Whig" view of United States antitrust history among scholars and practitioners celebrates the Merger Guidelines' implementation of increasingly sophisticated economic methods since their...
Antitrust and Competition
Algorithmic Collusion in the Housing Market
While the development of artificial intelligence has led to efficient business strategies, such as dynamic pricing, this new technology is vulnerable to collusion and consumer harm when companies share the same software through a central platform. Gabriele Bortolotti highlights the importance of antitrust enforcement in this domain for the second article in our series, using as a case study the RealPage class action lawsuit in the Seattle housing market.
Antitrust and Competition
The Future Markets Model Explains Meta/Within: A Reply to Herb Hovenkamp
In response to both Herb Hovenkamp’s February 27 article in ProMarket and, perhaps more importantly, also to Hovenkamp’s highly regarded treatise, Lawrence B. Landman, first, shows that the Future Markets Model explains the court’s decision in Meta/Within. Since Meta was not even trying to make a future product, the court correctly found that Meta would not enter the Future Market. Second, the Future Markets Model is the analytical tool which Hovenkamp says the enforcers lack when they try to protect competition to innovate.
Book Excerpts
The Chicago Boys and the Chilean Neoliberal Project
In a new book, The Chile Project: The Story of the Chicago Boys and the Downfall of Neoliberalism, Sebastian Edwards details the history of neoliberalism in Chile over the past seventy years. The Chicago Boys—a group of Chilean economists trained at the University of Chicago through the U.S. State Department’s “Chile Project”—played a central role in neoliberalism’s ascent during General Augusto Pinochet’s rule. What follows is an excerpt from the book on University of Chicago economist Milton Friedman’s 1975 visit to Chile to meet with Pinochet and business leaders.
Antitrust and Competition
Creating a Modern Antitrust Welfare Standard that Integrates Post-Chicago and Neo-Brandeisian Goals
Darren Bush, Mark Glick, and Gabriel A. Lozada argue that the Consumer Welfare Standard is inconsistent with modern welfare economics and that a modern approach to antitrust could integrate traditional Congressional goals as advocated by the Neo-Brandesians. Such an approach could be the basis for an alliance between the post-Chicago economists and the Neo-Brandesians.
Democracy
Getting Partisans To Listen to One Another Can Reduce Political Polarization
In new research, Guglielmo Briscese and Michèle Belot find that reminding Americans of shared values can open lines of communication and help reduce political polarization.
