Harry First
Harry First is the Charles L. Denison Professor of Law at New York University School of Law. He was twice a Fulbright Research Fellow in Japan and taught antitrust as an adjunct professor at the University of Tokyo. From 1999-2001, he served as Chief of the Antitrust Bureau of the Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York. Professor First’s scholarly writing includes a study of the Microsoft litigation, The Microsoft Antitrust Cases: Competition Policy for the Twenty-first Century (co-authored with Andrew Gavil), the casebook Free Enterprise and Economic Organization: Antitrust (co-authored with John Flynn and Darren Bush), and various book chapters and law review articles. First is a contributing editor of the Antitrust Law Journal, foreign antitrust editor of the Antitrust Bulletin, a member of the Executive Committee of the Antitrust Section of the New York State Bar Association, and a member of the Advisory Board of the American Antitrust Institute.
Antitrust and Competition
Why “The Jury’s Out” on the Government’s Case Against Google’s Ad Tech Monopoly
Last month, the U.S. Department of Justice and eight states sued Google, claiming it runs its digital ad business to unfairly advantage...
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Antitrust and Competition
Revising the Merger Guidelines To Return Antitrust to a Sound Economic and Legal Foundation
The draft Merger Guidelines largely replace the consumer welfare standard of the Chicago School with the lessening of competition principle found in the 1914 Clayton Act. This shift would enable the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice Antitrust Division to utilize the full extent of modern economics to respond to rising concentration and its harmful effects, writes John Kwoka.
Economic History
How Anthony Downs’s Analysis Explains Rational Voters’ Preferences for Populism
In new research, Cyril Hédoin and Alexandre Chirat use the rational-choice theory of economist Anthony Downs to explain how populism rationally arises to challenge established institutions of liberal democracy.
Antitrust and Competition
The Impact of Large Institutional Investors on Innovation Is Not as Positive as One Might Expect
In a new paper, Bing Guo, Dennis C. Hutschenreiter, David Pérez-Castrillo, and Anna Toldrà -Simats study how large institutional investors impact firm innovation. The authors find that large institutional investors encourage internal research and development but discourage firm acquisitions that would add patents and knowledge to their firms’ portfolios, hampering overall innovation.
Antitrust and Competition
The FTC Needs To Focus Arguments on Technological Transitions After High-Profile Losses
Joshua Gray and Cristian Santesteban argue that the Federal Trade Commission's focus in Meta-Within and Microsoft-Activision on narrow markets like VR fitness apps and consoles missed the boat on the real competition issue: the threat to future competition in nascent markets like VR platforms and cloud gaming.
Commentary
We Need Better Research on the Relationship Between Market Power and Productivity in the Hospital Industry
Antitrust debates have largely ignored questions about the relationship between market power and productivity, and scholars have provided little guidance on the issue due to data limitations. However, data is plentiful on the hospital industry for both market power and operating costs and productivity, and researchers need to take advantage, writes David Ennis.
Antitrust and Competition
Debating the Draft Merger Guidelines: Transcript
On September 7, the Stigler Center hosted a webinar to discuss the draft merger guidelines. What follows is a slightly edited transcript of the event.
Commentary
Holding Up the News
Meta has silenced news organizations’ social media accounts in response to Canada’s Online News Act, a law not yet in effect. Josh Braun describes the reasoning behind such legislation, its potential flaws, and how Meta, particularly Facebook, has turned the Canadian wildfire crisis into a regulatory pressure campaign.
