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Political Misinformation Thrives on Media Competition

In new research, Arseniy Samsonov builds a model showing how having available to the public a multitude of media outlets and social media platforms would not help reduce misinformation from politicians. Rather, monopolistic power could enable these outlets to retain control over the narratives around the information that these politicians provide to journalists and platforms in exchange for publicity and coverage, thus reducing misinformation.

The Wicked Problem Embodied by The Twitter Files

In response to a recent ProMarket post about the Twitter Files, professor Tom Ginsburg points out that the toughest question lies in...

The Thorny Problem of Social Media Platform Political Harms and Freedom of Speech

University of Chicago Booth/Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State 2002 Antitrust and Competition Conference “Antitrust: What’s Next?” Panel Discussion “Big Tech & Freedom of Speech” moderated by Binyamin Appelbaum of the New York Times with panelists Gilad Edelman of WIRED, Francis Fukuyama of Stanford University, Eric Goldman of Santa Clara University and Ellen Goodman of Rutgers University. April 21, 2022 (photo by Anne Ryan for University of Chicago)

Will “Portfolio Primacy” Throw a Monkey Wrench in Elon Musk’s Plans to Acquire Twitter?

The SEC's definition of fiduciary duty allows institutional shareholders to vote against Elon Musk's Twitter takeover bid thanks to portfolio primacy.

Nobel Laureate Oliver Hart on Empowering Twitter’s Shareholders

In an interview with ProMarket, Nobel laureate Oliver Hart explains why broadening our perspective on fiduciary duty beyond maximizing shareholder wealth could...

How Twitter Weakened India’s Information Ecosystem

India’s Covid-19 crisis is a reminder that Indian democracy is also in a crisis, partly due to an information ecosystem where facts...

Antitrust at CPAC: Conservatives Debate Breaking Up Big Tech

Speaking at the 2021 Conservative Political Action Conference, Congressmen Darrell Issa and Ken Buck discussed their stances on breaking up Big Tech,...

The Great Deplatforming: Can Digital Platforms Be Trusted As Guardians of Free Speech?

Online social media platforms accepted the role of moderating content from Congress in 1996. The Great Deplatforming that occurred after January 6...

Digital Platforms May Be Monopolistic Providers, But They Are Not Infrastructure

Social media platforms are not infrastructure nor natural monopolies, and they should be regulated only if they have monopolistic power and abuse...

The Silent Coup

President Donald Trump's seditious actions are exposing the political power that Twitter, Amazon, Google, Apple, and Facebook enjoy. Banning him from their...

LATEST NEWS

Why Have Uninsured Depositors Become De Facto Insured?

Due to a change in how the FDIC resolves failed banks, uninsured deposits have become de facto insured. Not only is this dangerous for risk in the banking system, it is not what Congress intends the FDIC to do, writes Michael Ohlrogge.

Merger Law Reaches Acquirer Incentives and Private Equity Strategies

Steven C. Salop argues that Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers in which the acquiring firm’s unilateral incentives and business strategy are likely to lessen market competition.

Tim Wu Responds to Letter by Former Agency Chief Economists

Former special assistant to the president for technology and competition policy Tim Wu responds to the November 27 letter signed by former chief economists at the Federal Trade Commission and Justice Department Antitrust Division calling for a separation of the legal and economic analysis in the draft Merger Guidelines.

Can the Public Moderate Social Media?

ProMarket student editor Surya Gowda reviews the arguments made by Paul Gowder in his new book, The Networked Leviathan: For Democratic Platforms.

Uninhibited Campaign Donations Risks Creating Oligarchy

In new research, Valentino Larcinese and Alberto Parmigiani find that the 1986 Reagan tax cuts led to greater campaign spending from wealthy individuals, who benefited the most from this policy. The authors argue that a very permissive system of political finance, combined with the erosion of tax progressivity, created the conditions for the mutual reinforcement of economic and political disparities. The result was an inequality spiral hardly compatible with democratic ideals.