Stanford 2025 Global Capitalism Trust and Accountability Conference

In new research, Anat R. Admati, Nate Atkinson, and Paul Pfleiderer argue that when misconduct is profitable, enforcement mechanisms aimed at deterring corporate misconduct often fail to achieve their goals and they may even backfire. The reason is that corporations can adjust internal governance mechanisms, particularly managerial compensation, to reduce or nullify the deterrent effects of corporate or managerial sanctions. These responses may lead to more misconduct and exacerbate social harm.

Richard Messick summarizes the output of last April’s Global Capitalism, Trust, and Accountability Conference, co-sponsored by the Stanford Graduate School of Business and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law. Participants explored the mechanisms of international corruption and how citizens, states, and the international community can address them.

Corporate crimes like fraud continue unabated in the United States. Jennifer Taub defines a chief reason as “accountability theater,” or the propensity of government prosecutors to pursue out-of-court civil settlements rather than criminal trials that, though they might lose them, would publicize the extent of corporate misconduct and better deter future abuse.

Elizabeth Pollman reviews barriers for holding corporations and their fiduciaries accountable under corporate and securities law.

Gerhard Schick discusses the CumEx and CumCum share-trading scandals that cost German taxpayers billions of euros over the course of several decades and the failures in political and social institutions that allowed these scandals to persist for so long.

Kleptocracy is often thought to plague developing countries, but this grand corruption would be infeasible without the West’s financial and legal plumbing to launder misbegotten gains. American and European government initiatives to remedy their complicity have run aground or even reversed course, particularly in the United States under the new Trump administration, writes Alexander Cooley.

Fabio De Pasquale, a prosecutor at the Milan prosecutor’s office who led the investigation into energy conglomerates Eni and Shell for their alleged involvement...

Corporations can sidestep prosecution by cooperating with the government and offering up employees to avoid their own criminal liability. Ellen S. Podgor discusses two prominent reasons why the current approach to corporate criminality is inefficient.

As private corporations gain unprecedented control over public data, Americans are losing access to the information that underpins democracy and critical aspects of their lives. D. Victoria Baranetsky argues that this rise of secrecy—driven by the rising value of data and government privatization—demands not just transparency, but a bold commitment to anti-secrecy as essential to democratic governance.

It is an economic truism that markets operate more efficiently and fairly when there is more transparency. However, in the case of sovereign debt markets, the virtues of transparency are partially offset by its costs, writes Mark Weidemaier. Without an international regulator or bankruptcy court, opacity sometimes advances the public interest, including by helping financially distressed governments protect assets.