Summary Teaser: Howell E. Jackson revisits George Stigler’s famous 1964 critique of the Securities and Exchange Commission and particularly his critique of the work of SEC lawyer Milton Cohen, who headed the SEC’s Special Study of Securities Markets in the early 1960s. Although time has validated Cohen’s intuitions regarding the value of expanding SEC oversight into over-the-counter markets, Stigler’s call for more careful economic analysis supported by robust empirical justification has heavily influenced how the SEC and other financial regulators stive to operate today.
Joel Seligman's article examines the historical debate surrounding the Securities and Exchange Commission's mandatory corporate disclosure system, focusing on George Stigler's influential 1964 critique and subsequent discussions. While acknowledging Stigler's role in sparking important questions about regulatory necessity, Seligman argues that critics often underestimated the historical evidence of securities fraud and the need for public market confidence, ultimately defending the continued relevance of mandated disclosure in securities regulation.
In new research, Seong Jin Ahn, Jared N. Jennings, and Yanrong Jia find that SEC enforcement against insider trading does not deter subsequent insider trading so much as displace it to other actors in the same industry.