Big Tech Antitrust Trials

Fiona Scott Morton and David Dinielli show how landmark antitrust cases historically have cleared the path for innovation in the next “frontier technology.” But with closing arguments in the search monopoly case just days away, Google threatens to evade this round of rigorous new competition. It reportedly is in talks to place its own artificial intelligence tool on Apple devices as it did in the case of search. Such a maneuver would entrench Google’s search monopoly and place Google in the driver’s seat to steer the development of consumer-facing AI. The authors offer up a menu of steps the government might take now to thwart Google’s new anticompetitive strategy and preserve competition in AI before it’s too late.

At the heart of the government’s lawsuit against Apple is if the tech company’s practices of tying and refusing to deal truly enhance the performance and security of the iPhone and its ancillary services. The complaint indicates that the outcome of the case will be determined by the consumer welfare standard, writes Herbert Hovenkamp.

The answer is both. How so? The recent antitrust complaint against Apple heralds a pivotal shift in understanding the influence of tech giants on innovation in the digital realm. This article highlights three key takeaways. 

Randy Picker reviews the context of the Department of Justice’s lawsuit against Apple and the questions of merit and the competitive obligations of dominant firms driving the case.

Fiona Scott Morton provides her initial thoughts on the Department of Justice’s lawsuit against Apple, how it compares to current and past tech cases, and the arguments she anticipates each side will make.

The various antitrust complaints the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have brought against Google, Amazon, and Facebook are based on monopolization claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Herbert Hovenkamp explains why the government should also  have relied on Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act to support their Big Tech cases.

At the heart of the United States Google Search case is the monopolizing effect of Google securing for its own search offering the status of default search engine on a web browser, such as Safari, Chrome, or Firefox. The authors review the behavioral economics and empirical evidence of this effect and suggest several conduct and structural remedies to open up the search market to competition.

Christian Bergqvist has identified 100-plus antitrust cases against Google spanning 23 jurisdictions and classifies them by the service in question and its alleged harms. Most of these fall within eight groups. Bergqvist’s analysis provides a picture of recent shifts in antitrust enforcers’ regulation of Big Tech and the potentially transformative consequences for Google and the entire tech industry.

Following the Federal Trade Commission’s 2021 publication of “Nixing the Fix: An FTC Report to Congress on Repair Restrictions,” private “right to repair” cases have multiplied against companies that leverage their market power in a “primary equipment market” (e.g., tractors) to force their customers also to purchase their offerings in “aftermarkets” (e.g., tractor repairs) that otherwise would be competitive. Daniel McCuaig argues that the application of the 1992 Supreme Court decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. to these cases misunderstands that case and improperly shields monopolists from competitive pressures, including in Epic’s recent case against Apple.

Erin Carroll writes that the lack of public access to the Google search antitrust trial has resulted in unprecedented secrecy which, she writes, could undermine the public’s trust in the outcome and start a dangerous trend amongst other Big Tech companies facing similar trials.