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Preventing AI Oligopoly and Digital Enclosure Via Compulsory Access

The largest artificial intelligence firms are able to afford access to quality data from content producers like the New York Times, while smaller startups are being left out. This dynamic risks concentrating markets and creating unassailable barriers to entry. Compulsory licenses offer one solution to lower barriers to entry for nascent AI firms without harming content producers and consumers, writes Kristelia García.

Content Licensing Agreements Will Concentrate Markets Without Standardized Access

Christian Peukert argues that the market for licensing content from copyright owners like newspapers or online forums requires a standardized regime if access to this data, used to train artificial intelligence models, is to remain available for more than just the largest AI firms. A failure to maintain non-discriminatory access will result in the consolidation of both the AI and content production markets.

The False Hope of Content Licensing at Internet Scale

Is there a world where AI developers could get the training data they need through content licensing deals? Matthew Sag argues that content licensing deals between developers of artificial intelligence and content owners are only possible for large content owners and cannot feasibly apply to the bulk of producers and owners of content on the internet.

Anticompetitive Acquiescence in AI Content Licensing

Large AI firms like OpenAI and Amazon are licensing content to train their models that they might otherwise have been able to access for free under the fair use doctrine. Mark A. Lemley and Jacob Noti-Victor write that this behavior may constitute anticompetitive acquiescence—where large firms agree to license content they don’t have to in order to raise rivals’ costs.

Novo Nordisk’s Offer To Acquire Metsera Constitutes Attempted Monopolization

Hannah Pittock uses weight-loss company Novo Nordisk’s offer to acquire Metsera to create a three-prong framework by which the antitrust agencies can identify when an invitation to exclude a rival from a market constitutes illegal exclusionary conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

Why the Controversy Behind ExxonMobil’s New Retail Voting Program?

ProMarket Managing Editor Andy Shi reviews the controversy behind ExxonMobil’s new voting program and how it falls into the broader debates over recent developments to shareholder democracy and corporate governance.

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