Regulation

Property Rights Provide an Exit From Social Institutions

In new research, evidence from a land titling campaign in the Democratic Republic of Congo shows that formal property rights can do more than secure land: they can give citizens an exit from costly informal obligations, writes Pablo Balán.

When Competitors Share Owners, They Automate More and Hire Less

In a new paper, Joseph Emmens, Dennis C. Hutschenreiter, Stefano Manfredonia, Felix Noth, and Tommaso Santini find that when competitors for the same pool of workers share investors, they increase their innovation to automate tasks and slow down hiring.    

AICOA II Is America’s Reverse Industrial Policy Initiative

The revived American Innovation Choice Online Act singles out a handful of Big Tech giants for unique, antitrust-like restrictions, but without the standard methodological...

Presidential Control of Independent Agencies Has a Price

The Supreme Court's decision in Trump v. Slaughter strips independent agencies of removal protections that made regulatory policy predictable across administrations. In new research, Brian Feinstein and Daniel Hemel find that equity markets assign real value to precisely that kind of insulation.

Bank Mergers Aren’t Raising Your Mortgage Rate

In new research examining 44 million U.S. mortgages and nearly 5,000 bank mergers over three decades, Celso Brunetti, Jeffrey H. Harris, and Ioannis Spyridopoulos find that bank consolidation does not raise mortgage rates, restrict credit access, or degrade loan quality. Local mortgage markets remain intensely competitive. 

The Proposed California Billionaire Wealth Tax Produces Inequities and Adverse Incentives

California’s proposed wealth tax on billionaires will struggle to accurately value and tax the wealth of California’s richest. Rather than fund the state’s massive budgetary commitments, the bill may drive away its largest taxpayers, write Ray Ball and Andrew Sutherland.

When is Corporate Bribery a Good Investment?

In new research, Vishavdeep Sharma and Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar analyze corporate corruption through the lens of market competition. Firms often bribe officials to block rivals from entering their markets, and their incentive to do so depends less on how competitive a market is than on what kind of competition it has.

When Mergers Break the Workplace     

In new research, Wei Cai, Andrea Prat, and Jiehang Yu evaluate how mergers affect employee satisfaction. They find that acquired firms report a decline in worker satisfaction, primarily revolving around “soft” benefits, such as workplace culture, management quality, and trust.

How Well Do Divestiture Remedies Work for Supermarket Mergers?

In new research, Xiao Dong, Paul Koh, Devesh Raval, Dominic Smith, and Brett Wendling evaluate how well divestiture remedies work for mergers in the supermarket industry. They find that past supermarket divestitures lead to lower employment, reduced sales, and higher rates of exit from the market relative to comparable non-divested supermarkets.  

Online Markets for Loans are Punishing Borrowers for Shopping     

Digital marketplaces make comparing credit lending options easier for potential borrowers. However, Jeromee "JJ" Johnson cautions that online platforms may be turning comparison itself into a signal to lenders—at a cost to applicants.

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