Thomas Mosk
Thomas Mosk is reseacher at the School of Economics and Finance at Queen Mary University London. His research lies in the boundaries of corporate finance, financial intermediation and political economics. Part of his attention has been drawn to understand how firms bargain with banks in credit negotiations. Recent work has examined how banks respond to higher capital requirements, and the interplay between supranational regulation and national authorities. He has published in the Review of Financial Studies. He received a research master’s degree in economics and Econometrics from the University of Groningen. Thomas was previously Ph.D. researcher at Tilburg University and visiting Ph.D. researcher at the Kellogg School of Management of Northwestern University, postdoctoral researcher at the Center of Excellence SAFE, the University of Zurich and visiting scholar at New York University.
Regulation
Letters that Matter: How Interest Groups Shape Financial Legislation
Members of Congress are inundated with an avalanche of correspondence on a daily basis. But what persuades them to heed the call?...
Latest news
Antitrust and Competition
Algorithmic Collusion in the Housing Market
While the development of artificial intelligence has led to efficient business strategies, such as dynamic pricing, this new technology is vulnerable to collusion and consumer harm when companies share the same software through a central platform. Gabriele Bortolotti highlights the importance of antitrust enforcement in this domain for the second article in our series, using as a case study the RealPage class action lawsuit in the Seattle housing market.
Antitrust and Competition
The Future Markets Model Explains Meta/Within: A Reply to Herb Hovenkamp
In response to both Herb Hovenkamp’s February 27 article in ProMarket and, perhaps more importantly, also to Hovenkamp’s highly regarded treatise, Lawrence B. Landman, first, shows that the Future Markets Model explains the court’s decision in Meta/Within. Since Meta was not even trying to make a future product, the court correctly found that Meta would not enter the Future Market. Second, the Future Markets Model is the analytical tool which Hovenkamp says the enforcers lack when they try to protect competition to innovate.
Book Excerpts
The Chicago Boys and the Chilean Neoliberal Project
In a new book, The Chile Project: The Story of the Chicago Boys and the Downfall of Neoliberalism, Sebastian Edwards details the history of neoliberalism in Chile over the past seventy years. The Chicago Boys—a group of Chilean economists trained at the University of Chicago through the U.S. State Department’s “Chile Project”—played a central role in neoliberalism’s ascent during General Augusto Pinochet’s rule. What follows is an excerpt from the book on University of Chicago economist Milton Friedman’s 1975 visit to Chile to meet with Pinochet and business leaders.
Antitrust and Competition
Creating a Modern Antitrust Welfare Standard that Integrates Post-Chicago and Neo-Brandeisian Goals
Darren Bush, Mark Glick, and Gabriel A. Lozada argue that the Consumer Welfare Standard is inconsistent with modern welfare economics and that a modern approach to antitrust could integrate traditional Congressional goals as advocated by the Neo-Brandesians. Such an approach could be the basis for an alliance between the post-Chicago economists and the Neo-Brandesians.
Democracy
Getting Partisans To Listen to One Another Can Reduce Political Polarization
In new research, Guglielmo Briscese and Michèle Belot find that reminding Americans of shared values can open lines of communication and help reduce political polarization.
Antitrust and Competition
The State of The Debate on U.S. Antitrust and Competition
This year’s Stigler Center conference on antitrust and competition invited scholars to propose alternatives to the consumer welfare standard.
Antitrust and Competition
The Impact of Algorithms on Competition and Competition Law
Antonio Capobianco, the deputy head of the OECD Competition Division and one of the authors of the 2023 OECD report on algorithmic competition and collusion, explains the risks that algorithms and artificial intelligence pose to competition and how regulators can approach the changing competition paradigm.