Olivier Coibion is the Malcolm Forsman Centennial Professor of Economics at The University of Texas at Austin. He received a BA in Economics and Political Economy from the University of California at Berkeley (1999) and a PhD from the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor (2007). He works on macroeconomic topics, including monetary policy, how agents for their expectations, inflation measurement, commodity prices, inequality, the efficacy of stimulus payments, and policy communication. Prior to joining UT Austin, Olivier worked at the International Monetary Fund, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Brookings Institution, and the College of William and Mary. He is also affiliated with the National Bureau of Economic Research and serves as a consultant to a number of central banks.
Using a household survey with information treatments conducted in the aftermath of the SVB’s collapse, we examine the potential for a large bank’s failure to trigger bank runs and the effectiveness of public communication in containing such a risk. We find that news about SVB’s collapse increases households’ propensity to withdraw bank deposits as people become more worried that their bank may fail and expect larger losses on deposits in case of bank failure. Communication by the Federal Reserve in support of the banking sector and information about FDIC deposit insurance can contain the risk of bank runs, while communication from politicians influences only their electoral base.
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