Francesco Grigoli is a Senior Economist in the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (on leave) and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. Previously, he worked in the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department and Western Hemisphere Department and was a visiting scholar at Columbia University. He published extensively in leading academic journals and policy outlets on a wide range of topics in macroeconomics and international economics. His current research focuses on inflation expectations, price formation, monetary policy, and international finance. Francesco received his PhD in Economics from the University of Insubria and holds a Master's in International Economics from the University of Sussex.
Using a household survey with information treatments conducted in the aftermath of the SVB’s collapse, we examine the potential for a large bank’s failure to trigger bank runs and the effectiveness of public communication in containing such a risk. We find that news about SVB’s collapse increases households’ propensity to withdraw bank deposits as people become more worried that their bank may fail and expect larger losses on deposits in case of bank failure. Communication by the Federal Reserve in support of the banking sector and information about FDIC deposit insurance can contain the risk of bank runs, while communication from politicians influences only their electoral base.
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