Home The Equitable Economy ESG, Corporate Governance & Future of the Firm Will “Portfolio Primacy” Throw a Monkey Wrench in Elon Musk’s Plans to...

Will “Portfolio Primacy” Throw a Monkey Wrench in Elon Musk’s Plans to Acquire Twitter?

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dmoberhaus via Creative Commons

The SEC’s definition of fiduciary duty allows institutional shareholders to vote against Elon Musk’s Twitter takeover bid thanks to portfolio primacy.


Is the Musk takeover of Twitter really a done deal? In a recent interview with Brooke Fox of ProMarket, Oliver Hart, the Nobel prize-winning economist, claimed that the fiduciary duties of investment advisers to index funds, such as BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street (the Big Three), would compel them to vote for Elon Musk’s offer to buy Twitter given his willingness to pay a significant premium over market price. Professor Hart made his claim based on his understanding that their fiduciary duties require them “to act in a way that maximizes financial return.”

Even though I share Professor Hart’s understanding of the fiduciary duties of investment advisers, I respectfully disagree with Professor Hart’s claim and argue that the fiduciary duties of the Big Three and other investment advisers to mutual funds and exchange traded funds (EFTs) allow these advisers to vote “no” on the Musk transaction. This can be done based on a maximization approach to fund investing called “portfolio primacy.”

The Fiduciary Duties of Investment Advisers

According to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in its “Proxy Voting Rule,” investment advisers to mutual funds and ETFs owe each of their clients (the funds they manage and their beneficial investors) “duties of care and loyalty with respect to all services undertaken on the client’s behalf, including proxy voting.” Moreover, these duties require the shareholder voting authority delegated by these funds to their investment advisers to be executed “in a manner consistent with the best interest of its client and must not subrogate client interests to its own.”  

The wording used by the SEC uses to describe this fiduciary duty is broad and does not mention the requirement of maximizing the financial interests of clients when voting. I have found this broad language disconcerting and have argued that this guidance allows investment advisers to act opportunistically and needs to be tightened up.  Nevertheless, if an investment adviser like Vanguard correctly determines its legal obligation to be one of value maximization, this still does not require the Big Three and other investment advisers to vote to approve Musk’s takeover of Twitter.

Portfolio Primacy

This is because an investment adviser who manages a stock fund should be managing the fund based on an approach that attempts to maximize the financial value of the entire stock portfolio at any point in time, not just the value of any individual stock investment. This approach is referred to as “portfolio primacy.”

“Because the S&P 500 fund has so much more in terms of dollar holdings of Tesla than Twitter, this expected reduction in the market value of Tesla stock could easily outweigh whatever positive value the fund derives from Musk purchasing Twitter.”

For example, consider how an investment adviser to a S&P 500 index fund could utilize portfolio primacy in deciding how to vote on Musk’s $54.20 share offer for Twitter. The S&P 500 index is a market-value weighted index. When a fund is based on this index, it will have in its portfolio approximately 20 times more in dollar holdings of Tesla stock versus Twitter stock. This means that any change in market value in Tesla stock is much more important to the total market value of the S&P fund than a change in market value of Twitter stock.

Moreover, let’s say that the investment adviser to the S&P 500 fund comes to the conclusion that a Musk takeover of Twitter will so distract Musk from his duties at Tesla that it will lead to a significant reduction in the market value of Telsa’s stock.  Because the S&P 500 fund has so much more in terms of dollar holdings of Tesla than Twitter, this expected reduction in the market value of Tesla stock could easily outweigh whatever positive value the fund derives from Musk purchasing Twitter.

It is important to note that focusing on this issue should be important not only to investment advisers to index funds, such as the Big Three, but also to any portfolio manager who holds large dollar amounts of Tesla stock in portfolio relative to Twitter stock. This makes it reasonable for the investment adviser consider spending the time and resources necessary to coming to a determination on this issue.

Conclusion

In sum, the fiduciary duties of investment advisers to mutual funds and ETFs should not be an impediment to those advisers voting against the Musk acquisition of Twitter. Moreover, for those investment advisers who make the determination that the expected harm to the value of Tesla stock far outweighs the increase in value that the Musk acquisition would create for the fund, voting against the acquisition would be a reasonable action to take. 

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Bernard S. Sharfman is a Senior Corporate Governance Fellow with the RealClearFoundation, a research fellow with the Law & Economics Center at George Mason University's Antonin Scalia Law School, and a member of the Journal of Corporation Law's editorial advisory board. Mr. Sharfman has written extensively on corporate law and governance. His recent writings have included: Opportunism in the Shareholder Voting and Engagement of the ‘Big Three’ Investment Advisers to Index Funds (forthcoming, Journal of Corporation Law); The Illusion of Success: A Critique of Engine No. 1's Proxy Fight at ExxonMobil (Harvard Business Law Review Online 2022); How Discretionary Decision-Making Impacts the Financial Performance and Legal Disclosures of S&P 500 Funds (with Vincent Deluard, Director of Market Research, StoneX; forthcoming, Brooklyn Law Review 2022); Liberating the Market for Corporate Control (with Marc T. Moore; Berkeley Business Law Journal 2021); ESG Investing Under ERISA (Yale Journal on Regulation Online (2020)); The Risks and Rewards of Shareholder Voting (SMU Law Review 2020); Now is the Time to Designate Proxy Advisors as Fiduciaries under ERISA (Stanford Journal of Law, Business, and Finance 2019); The Undesirability of Mandatory Time-Based Sunsets in Dual Class Share Structures: A Reply to Bebchuk and Kastiel (Southern California Law Rev. Postscript 2019); Enhancing the Value of Shareholder Voting Recommendations (Tennessee Law Review); A Private Ordering Defense of a Company’s Right to Use Dual Class Share Structures in IPOs, (Villanova Law Review 2018); The Importance of the Business Judgment Rule (New York University Journal of Law & Business 2018); Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in Corporate Governance (with Paul Rose; Brigham Young University Law Review 2015); Activist Hedge Funds in a World of Board Independence: Creators or Destroyers of Long-Term Value? (Columbia Business Law Review 2016); and A Theory of Shareholder Activism as its Place in Corporate Law (Tennessee Law Review 2016). Mr. Sharfman has peer reviewed articles for the Stanford Law Review and the Yale Law Journal. Mr. Sharfman has written a number of comment letters to the SEC, NASDAQ, Department of Labor, and the New York Stock Exchange and his blog posts can be found on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, Columbia Law School's Blue Sky Blog, the Oxford Business Law Blog, the University of Chicago Business Law Review Blog, and Duke Law School's FinReg Blog. Mr. Sharfman has practiced corporate and securities law and is a graduate of the Georgetown University Law Center (J.D., 2000). At Georgetown, he was an Executive Editor of the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics and a recipient of the journal's Saint Thomas More Award.

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